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The media often influence public perceptions through biased coverage of events and people. Such influence is particularly obvious in the case of the 1929 Communist-led strike in Gastonia, North Carolina. During the strike, press on opposing sides daily and flamboyantly ran articles depicting the horrors of the other. In the decades immediately after the strike, the press continued to study the event but highlighted the Communist threat to the nation. The press especially emphasized this threat during the Red Scare and the McCarthy era. Since the age of McCarthy, the press has continued to run stories, produce articles, and write books about this strike, but with a new focus. The strike became, and remains, both a measuring stick used to judge other strikes and a point of historical pride for the community. Although the focus of the Gastonia strike shifted throughout the years, the strike remains a staple of labor history and its story epitomizes the impact press coverage can have on understanding historical events.

In April 1929, mill owners of the Loray Mill in Gastonia, North Carolina, refused workers’ demands for increased wages and better working conditions. On April 2, 1929, Fred Beal led 2,000 workers from the Loray Mill out on strike under the auspices of the National Textile Workers Union (NTWU), a Communist-run organization. Nervous because
of the NTWU’s Communist ties, the mill owners and local authorities became restless. They tried to put an end to the strike, but to no avail. Finally the sheriff and the mayor of Gastonia called Governor O. Max Gardner for help, and on April 3 five units of the North Carolina National Guard arrived in Gastonia to protect the mill and maintain order (Salmond 24).

The presence of the National Guardsmen produced more unrest and resulted in hundreds of arrests, the destruction of property, and, eventually, the deaths of two people: Police Chief Orville Aderholt and striker Ella Mae Wiggins. Aderholt was shot after trying to invade the strikers’ tent colony without a search warrant, a colony that had been set up after strikers had been evicted from their homes (Salmond 72-73). Wiggins was riding in the back of a truck on her way to a workers’ rally when a mob opened fire. Wiggins was shot and killed instantly (Salmond 128). The wave of arrests following the murder of Aderholt and the shock of Wiggins’ death undermined the strike, and by the end of August, the strikers were back at work.

The collapse of the strike did not mean the end of the saga. Much of Gastonia called for convictions in the death of Aderholt. Outraged that their sheriff had been murdered by “Reds,” citizens demanded justice. Ultimately seven were tried for the death of Aderholt. Despite the lack of evidence, all were convicted and handed prison sentences of up to twenty years. All seven eventually escaped to Russia. The suspects in the murder of Ella Mae Wiggins were tried and released, in spite of incriminating eyewitness accounts.

The episode received extensive contemporary press coverage, but little of that coverage was balanced. The Communist-produced Daily Worker and Labor Defender ran stories depicting the maliciousness of the mill owners. Both papers portrayed the owners as evil adversaries who used terrorist tactics and thugs to achieve their goals of suppression and slavery. Using colorful adjectives, the Communists described their enemies as either “drunken degenerates” (Reeve 117) or terrorists and war-mongers (Beal 131). When the city council responded to such verbal abuse by passing a new law that made profanity illegal, the Labor Defender linked the law and its supporters to Satan: “All policemen think that the regions of Lucifer should be treated with reverence during a strike and that the name of his Satanic Majesty should not be taken in vain” (“Mill Hands” 138). The Communists continued their propaganda, using captions under pictures to suggest evil schemes and conspiracy. The caption under a picture of the police chief in the August edition of the Labor Defender read, “Chief O. Aderholt, … mill owners’ servant, plotting terror against strikers…” (Wagenkneght 152).

Not only did the Communists portray the evils of the mill owners, but they also depicted the workers as heroes. NTWU leader Albert Weisbord wrote in the Labor Defender:

> The employers are mobilizing their whole forces to crush the workers. They have raised the cry of Bolshevism, of Russian gold, of red anarchy, of revolution… . But they have not been able to shake the workers in their loyalty to the leadership or the strike… . That these southern workers of old native stock… rally to leaders professedly communist, and to a union professedly of a militant character, speaks volumes for the conditions of the South and the correctness and character of the leadership of our Union. (101)

One article, edited by Communist Party leader John Owens, compared their work to American patriots and stated, “Why yesterday they were merely mill slaves living in company owned homes. Today they are rebels. Theirs is the tradition of resistance to tyranny” (101).
The discussion of heroism and the correctness of the Union appeared not merely in type, but also in cartoons and advertisements, for which the Labor Defender was famous. One cartoon portrayed the mill-owners as a dragon labeled “Gastonia Frame-up.” The dragon, lying on its back, watches in fear as a strong hero in the garb of a worker raises his ever-true sword of Communism and prepares to kill the dragon, destroying the threat. The heading reads, “The Murder of Sacco and Vanzetti must not be Forgotten! Save the Gastonia Prisoners!” (“The Murder”). Advertisements took on a variety of forms. Some called for action—“Smash the Murder Frame-up! Defend the Gastonia Textile Workers!”—while others cried of the horrors through which the Communists suffered—“7 Gastonia Strikers are Sentenced to 117 Years! 32 Other Workers in Capitalist Dungeons Have Already Spent the Best of Their Lives in Jail!” (“Smash”; “7 Gastonia” 248).

The Communist press also emphasized that the struggle was for workers’ rights. The Daily Worker called for the South to “organize a militant, progressive union to fight the bosses for better conditions” (Speed-Up”). The Labor Defender stated, “A new day is dawning when the workers of the South take their place as among the most militant-element among the best fighters, the staunchest soldiers in the army of the working class” (Reeve 117). The Communist press thus sought to demonize the mill owners, empower the strikers, and demonstrate the righteousness of the strike.

The owners, on the other hand, used the press for very different goals. Early in the strike, the Gastonia Gazette ran editorials paid for by the “citizens of Gaston County” warning its readers of the true nature and intentions of the Communists. Attacking Beal in its first editorial, the Gazette reported that he “openly called upon those who paid their 50 cents dues to join the so-called union, to engage in violence, and even bloodshed if necessary.” In its issues of April 3 and 5, 1929, the paper ran colorful headlines such as “Red Russianism Lifts its Gory Hands Right here in Gastonia,” “Call Out the Militia,” and “Reds are Threatening Southwide Textile Strike.” Attempting to stir up as much reaction against Communism as they could, the paper ignored the fact that the only violence that occurred was caused by the anti-Communist forces.

The mill owners were willing to go to extremes in the Gazette to try to end the strike as quickly as possible. They challenged their readers to see themselves as either for or against their country. In an editorial entitled “Mob Rule vs. Law and Order,” the editors called for the rallying of all good patriots to the aid of their country:

Every patriotic, law abiding American Citizen who was at the Loray Mill yesterday could see the difference between mob rule on one hand and law and order on the other...between the STARS AND STRIPES, the beautiful emblem of this Republic, and the blood red banner of Bolshevism, the flag of those who favor the destruction
of all constitutional government, the flag of Revolution and bloodshed…. THE STRIKE AT THE LORAY IS SOMETHING MORE THAN MERELY STRIKING FOR BETTER WAGES…. IT WAS STARTED SIMPLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF OVERTHROWING THIS GOVERNMENT AND DESTROYING PROPERTY AND TO KILL, KILL, KILL. THE TIME IS AT HAND FOR EVERY AMERICAN TO DO HIS DUTY. (‘Mob Rule’ 7)

Anti-Communist forces thus depicted the strikes as un-American and declared the only patriotic action was to oppose the Communists, the union, and the strike.

Had this press battle been the end of the coverage of the strike, it would have remained an interesting event in history, but it would hardly have retained its importance. The Gastonia Strike has become a legend in American labor history as evidenced by its continued mention in the press. Communist-run publications, such as the Labor Defender and the Daily Worker, were consistent in their portrayal of the strike. They viewed Gastonia authorities as enemies, and Communism, not unions, remained the main focus of their coverage. This should not be much of a surprise. Of more interest is the story told by the mainstream press, a story that has evolved over the decades and has reshaped the understanding of the events at the Loray Mill.

The evolution of this press coverage becomes first apparent in writings of the 1930s. Although the strike was over, the press battled over its central issue. Some organizations rejected the idea that Communism was the central issue in the strike. The American Civil Liberties Union was among the first non-Communist groups to argue this in a pamphlet published in May 1930 entitled “Justice – North Carolina Style, The record of the year’s struggle for unions in Gastonia and Marion, April 1929 to April 1930.” It stated that although many people believed that mill owners were “fighting a Communist invasion from the North, bent… upon arousing southern workers to revolutionary efforts… [s]uch a contention is wholly untrue…” (6). Ultimately, the pamphlet recalled the strike from the perspective of the workers, emphasizing the mill owners’ domination and unnecessary violence in Gastonia.

In contrast, strike organizer Beal claimed a Communist invasion was precisely the union’s intent. Returning from Russia in 1937, Beal decided that prison life in the United States was better than freedom in the Soviet Union (“Testifies”). In 1937 he wrote an article for The American Mercury entitled “I Was a Communist Martyr,” in which he explained his conversion from a devout Communist to a staunch anti-Communist. For him, Communism was the central issue in the Loray Mill strike, and he explained, “I became a Working Class Enemy when I refused to subordinate my Communist convictions to the Stalin whip” (Beal). This change affected his view of the 1929 strike. From Beal’s perspective, the Gastonia strike was a disaster that was not to be remembered. Rather than extolling the efforts of
those who participated in the strike, he recalled it in the following way:

Gastonias, and its interlude of bloody terror, is now little more than a footnote in the
strike history of our times. And yet, in many respects, it was the ominous curtain-
raiser of all the Class Warfare that has followed. From the beginning, it was a
hundred-percent Communist-led strike. ("Communist Martyr")

Gastonia, however, was anything but a footnote in strike history. The press in the latter
half of the 1930s not only remembered the strike; it began to present a more balanced
assessment. In 1938, the New York Times recalled the Gastonia strike, called for the public
to rally in support of Beal’s "vindication and release," and listed a number of prominent
representatives who had rallied around him ("Join Group"). When Beal testified in 1939
before the Dies Committee, the New York Times again reported on the situation. The main
focus was on the fact that Beal admitted that the Communists were behind the strike the
entire time. The headlines for October 19 read: "Testifies Reds Led Strike, Dies Witness
Says Their Aim Was to Build New Unions Run by Communists." The Times mentioned the
strike casually, without offering its readers much more than one or two names and a date to
specify which strike and explain the situation.

Not all of the papers addressed the strikers' efforts as objectively as the New York Times.
Not surprisingly, the Gastonia Gazette still remembered the strike in an article entitled
"Gastonia of the Long Ago." In this April 8, 1939, article, the paper recalled headlines from
the strike such as "Pershing and Beal Strive to Bolster Strikes" and "Waning Zeal is Fanned
by Speeches Appealing to Class Prejudice…." The paper continued, remembering the
militancy of the situation, by reprinting a portion of an article which assured the people that
should the National Guardsmen leave, they would be replaced by "hand-picked" deputies
from the American Legion.

The press in the 1940s turned back to Communism as the focus of the Gastonia strike,
reflecting the popular sentiment as the nation moved towards the second Red Scare. The
In November of 1940, Governor Clyde Hoey of North Carolina reduced Beal's seventeen-
to twenty-year sentence by seven years. Beal continued to make headlines when he was
released on parole in 1942, and regained his citizenship in 1945. Two epithets remain
attached to all of these mentions of Beal in the 1940’s articles: his name is almost always
followed by the phrase "former Communist" or "former Communist labor organizer," and
he is associated with the death of sheriff Aderholt ("Beal Sentence," "Fred Beal Leaves,"
"Beal Regains").

The Gastonia press continued to emphasize the innocence of the mill owners and
officers of the law. The Gastonia Gazette focused on violence rather than Communism,
blaming the strikers yet again for the hostilities. This is evidenced in a 1945 interview
with Captain Charlie Hord of the Gastonia Police. After twenty-five years of service, Hord
was still affected by the strike. When he was asked to recall some of his most memorable
experiences, the Loray Mill Strike, which Hord claimed he “remembered most vividly,”
composed almost one-third of the article (Phillips). He described the strike’s “disorder” on
the part of the workers and the control that the department had to exert to maintain peace in
the town, depicting the workers as dangerous and unruly. He remembered Aderholt’s death
but made no mention of Ella Mae Wiggins’s murder. The Gazette stated, “[S]ome of us were
too young to remember the facts about the calamitous year of 1929, but Captain Hord recalls
with clarity the dark days before and after his chief was slain.”

The 1950s provided a special point of remembrance for the strike on two counts: the year 1954 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the strike, and many people connected with the strike died during this decade. For Gastonia, the anniversary strike meant recalling the violence of the strike and remembering Aderholt as a hero of the police force. In the *Gastonia Gazette*, the strike was a recurring topic in a regular feature, a column called “Looking Backward” in which items from the paper on that same date twenty-five years earlier were re-published. The paper filled April, May, and June with selections and pieces from the 1929 Loray Mill strike. The June 8 edition ran a front-page headline of Aderholt’s death. It recalled its sheriff as the hero and martyr of the Gastonia strike, explaining that the police chief was simply doing his job—ignoring the fact that he was there illegally. The *Gazette* remembered Ella Mae Wiggins’s death only in the form of tidbits from the “Looking Back” column of September 16. Although by far the longest item in the column, Wiggins’ death received much less attention than Aderholt’s. Regardless of the position the rest of the press took, both in and out of North Carolina, Gastonia refused to change its view concerning the strike: the mill owners and the police chief had been wronged.

With the nation in the middle of the Second Red Scare, the press could not avoid the mention of Communism, but they were surprisingly supportive of the strikers and their leaders, even memorializing them in their passing. Three people involved in the Gastonia strike died in the 1950s. A. L. Bulwinkle, one of North Carolina’s congressional representatives, died at sixty-seven years old. As part of his credentials, the *New York Times* of September 1, 1950, listed the fact that he was one of the leading prosecuting attorneys in the Gastonia Case (“A.L. Bulwinkle”). Next, in a *Times* obituary of February 24, 1952, Miss Anna Pennypacker, co-owner of the *Daily Worker*, was remembered for being arrested after the police raided a meeting “held in connection with the Gastonia (N.C.) textile strike.” Finally, on November 15, 1954, Fred Beal, one of the strike’s main personalities, died of a heart attack at 57 years old. The *Times* headline the next day read: “Ex-Red, Imprisoned in Strike, Dies at 57.” The articles about Pennypacker and Beal emphasized the communist activities in which they participated. The article about Bulwinkle portrayed his participation in the strike simply as a prosecutor, indicating that his participation was another part of his pristine civic record.

By the 1960s, the strike should have received less press attention; for once the mills in North Carolina were quiet. In October 1961, however, the *Gastonia Gazette* proved once again that it could not let its readers forget the horrors of the strike or its Communist influence. The Gastonia press prided itself on the fact that the community had defeated the Communist invasion of North Carolina. Radio commentator Paul Harvey went to Gastonia to air a special broadcast about the strike. On October 26, 1962, the *Gazette* published the text of his broadcast in the paper under the headline “Commies Were Losers...It was 1929 – We had Reds.” Harvey’s published broadcast read more like a radio drama than a report:

But once upon a time the Communists came across the Catawba river and invaded Gastonia, North Carolina...head on... . The Soviet Communists brazenly set out to invade the new world... . They figured they could feed the dormant fires of resentment...and renew civil war.... They sent a red-haired Red to coordinate and command the attack... . He was not interested in the welfare of the workers. His mission was to communize the country. His objective was to tear this city apart....
There were raids by night by men in masks. Food was thrown into the street where hungry men could see. Then drenched with kerosene and burned...before their eyes. Protest parades erupted into violence. Bibles were hurled into the street midst ugly cries: "Nobody believes that stuff now!" It is interesting to note how many newspapers in big cities far away...praised the Communist and his conquest. But in the files of the reliable *Gastonia Gazette*, I read THE REST OF THE STORY.

Harvey mentioned Wiggins in his report, but he never mentioned her death.

This was not the only article Harvey wrote about Gastonia. In the June 1962 issue of the *American Legion Magazine*, Harvey discussed Beal’s return and the failure of the Gastonia effort in dramatic, criminal terms: “After 20 years of despair and disillusionment, Beal was a broken man, virtually a derelict. But he had one thing to do before he could die in peace. He had to return to the scene of his crime and serve out his term” (47). Harvey ignored the fact that Beal had been successful and happy as a Communist until he went to Russia. In addition, Harvey disregarded the low wages and bad working conditions of the mill that prompted the strike in the first place, giving neither Beal nor the strikers any credit for trying to make improvements and assert their rights.

As much as the *Gastonia Gazette* despised Communism, it changed its emphasis in the 1970s from Communism to the violence of the strike and its importance on a more global, long-term scale. On November 14, 1976, the *Gazette* published an article entitled “The Battle for Labor Goes On.” Referring to the 1929 strike, reporter Tom Smith wrote, “It has now been 47 years since the bloody Loray Mill strike. The Mill is now owned by Firestone Textile Company. Workers are much better paid...but the battle for the hearts and minds of labor continues.... Fortunately, the fighting is non-violent. Now. It wasn’t always that way. It is a battle fought with words, not bullets.” The Gastonia Strike was held as the example of the worst-case scenario for strikes in a mill, and Gastonia reporters continued to portray it as such. As the April 30, 1977, *Gazette* headline read, “Loray Strike was a Bloody Page in History.”

The use of the Gastonia strike as a standard is evidenced in an article the *New York Times* ran on November 27, 1977, comparing the hard times of the ‘70s to the Passaic strike of 1926. The Passaic strike was a large strike in its own right, but even in this direct comparison between Passaic and the ‘70s, the author could not forego mentioning the 1929 Gastonia strike. Gastonia was the one strike most of the public could recognize and its citation in this article, even though it was not the focus, demonstrates the impact it had on both the press and the public.

In the 1980s the press’s treatment of the strike took a new direction. Issues concerning
heritage and historical recognition arose, especially in Gaston County. In 1986, some
members of the community wanted to place a marker in Gastonia about the Loray Mill strike,
but the proposal was controversial. A headline of the Charlotte Observer of June 15, 1986,
read, “Erecting Historical Marker About Loray Strike Touchy Matter.” The article noted that
North Carolina’s Department of Cultural Resources proposed a plaque with the text “A strike
in 1929 at the Loray Mill, one block south, left two dead and spurred opposition to labor
unions statewide.” Mayor Harry Connor of Gastonia strongly objected. Having text was
fine, but it had to be more historically accurate. Consulting Robert L. Williams, identified as
writer-in-residence at the Gaston County Community College, Connor countered the state’s
proposal with the following text: “In the 1929 strike, one block south, local citizens defeated
the first Communist efforts to control southern textiles.” Williams, who had written a book,
Gaston County: A Pictorial History, sided with the Gastonia version of the strike. His book
featured information about the strike and focused solely on the death of Chief Aderholt,
making no mention of the death of Ella Mae Wiggins (119-32).

The Gastonia press continued to promote the belief that the mill owners were defending
the citizens of Gastonia against Communists. Once again, it refused to acknowledge the fact
that the strikers were battling for their rights. Gastonia resident Alan Waufle summed up the
issue regarding the marker: “Some people might not want a reference to the strike, but it’s a
part of local history and it can’t be swept under the rug” (Erecting”).

In spite of the 1986 struggle over the sign, whether the Gastonia residents defended
their fair city from a Communist invasion or whether the strike “spurred opposition to labor
unions,” outside papers, such as the Charlotte Observer, began to minimize Communist
involvement in the strike. In an article about Gastonia’s beginnings and highlights, the
Observer described the mill as “a national target for union efforts” and explained that a
strike erupted in which some “self-avowed Communists were involved” (“City’s Story”).
This portrayal demonstrated that the Observer treated Communist involvement skeptically,
focusing on the rights of the strikers and the reasons for which they struck.

Press coverage of the strike in the 1990s saw a continuation of old traditions and the
institution of new ones. Beal’s assessment of the strike as a “footnote” was once again
proven wrong in the New York Times’ sub-heading of its book review of John A. Salmond’s
Gastonia 1929: The Story of the Loray Mill Strike: “The Loray Mill strike was short-lived but
it endures in the annals of legend” (“Union Made”). The press also continued to emphasize
the strike as a gauge for worst-case scenarios, with the Raleigh News and Observer using
it as a measuring tool by comparing it to the atrociousness of a contemporary strike
(“Durham’s Labor”). Finally, the press continued to recognize the bad reputation Gastonia
had earned because of the strike. In an article entitled “This Time It Was Good News,” the
Charlotte Observer opened with the lines, “What a treat it was to pick up Monday’s Wall
Street Journal and see Gastonia claiming a front page headline – for something good for a
change,” and the article went on to mention that the 1929 strike was one of the many pieces
of bad press that had emanated from Gastonia over the years.

A positive change in the 1990s was that of the recognition of Ella Mae Wiggins’ death. The
Fayetteville Observer published a book review of Margaret Suplee and Emily Herring
Wilson’s book North Carolina Women Making History. The staff writer of the paper noted
that Wiggins was one of the six examples of women who made history (Parker). Although
the description is slightly exaggerated, the fact that Wiggins had finally received mention
without connection to Aderholt’s death is evidence of the press’s evolution. Fayetteville was not the only town to recognize authors who wrote about Wiggins. The *Charlotte Observer* featured a book of poems called *Eureka Mill* about “folks who moved from the mountains to work in plants from Gaston County to Chester, S.C.” Staff writer Joe DePriest noted, “The Ballad of Ella May [sic] Wiggins’ retells the violent tale of the union balladeer killed during Gastonia’s 1929 Loray Mill strike” (DePriest).

Gastonia, however, continued to push the issue of Aderholt’s death. In 1998, someone made an anonymous donation to the town’s police department to erect a memorial to those who died in action. First on the list was Chief Orville Aderholt, “who was shot June 7, 1929, during the strike at the old Loray Mill” (“Memorial”). That was it. There was no mention of Aderholt’s intruding illegally on the tent colony without a search warrant. He had simply died in the line of duty. While it is regrettable that anyone died in this situation, the press treated him as if he were the only one killed during the strike.

There have been other strikes in Gastonia since 1929. And one of them in 1934 was much larger. But the strike at the Loray Mill is a watershed. The fact remains that the Gastonia strike was memorialized by the press, and coverage of it has evolved to make the strike a legend in labor history. At the same time, Gastonia serves as a reminder that the media can impact and influence historical perceptions. Printing varied and biased perspectives of events, the press shaped the public’s view of history. As people across the nation read of the strike in Gastonia, the newspaper they took to their homes and offices told them a particular story—a story that was not always the same as the one in the newspaper in the next town or county. The motive was not to confuse the readers in various towns, but to ensure that that particular story would interest readers. Those who read the *New York Times* were concerned about Gastonia’s labor troubles. The uneasy citizens of Gastonia felt compelled to read of the possibility of a Communist invasion. But the papers spanned time as well as distance. The consumers in the 1940s were eager to read of a potential “Red Scare” as they faced the daily fear of a potential Communist invasion. Those in the 1980s worried more about labor and civic rights and were less interested in reading of a Communist Party that was largely inactive and posed no threat. The press printed what would sell. It still does. A “Red Scare” may not sell papers today, but the desire to read of a scare has not abated.

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New or Renewed? A Study in the Biblical Theology of Creation and Restoration

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When the Christmas celebration approaches, many Americans gather to watch the Frank Capra classic *It’s a Wonderful Life*, in which a good-hearted businessman who has fallen upon hard times is granted supernatural insight into the value of his life by the angelic spirit of a kindly old man. The story assumes the popular understanding of the Christian perspective on eternity, namely, that humans who die with a good heart enter into a purely spiritual existence, becoming angels drifting around in the clouds for eternity. This view, also reflected in such pop-culture icons as Bil Keane’s *Family Circus* comic strip and the animated Don Bluth film *All Dogs Go to Heaven*, affirms a tradition of understanding which dates back to medieval Roman thought on heaven and hell and which is reflected even in many traditional Protestant hymns. Though this view has been held by many Christians throughout the ages, a closer study of the Bible raises serious questions regarding the validity of this view. In the end, contrary to the popular view, the biblical themes of creation and new creation require an understanding of the Christian’s eternal life as occurring not within a discarnate spiritual realm, but within the incarnate physicality of a renewed heaven and earth under the reign of the resurrected Christ.
A true understanding of the biblical teaching regarding new creation must begin with a study of the scriptural theme of creation. The foundational text for this study is, naturally, the creation account in Genesis 1-3. Counter to the anti-material claims of Gnosticism, the creation in Genesis 1 is repeatedly described by God as “good” and even “very good” (Gen. 1:31). Though the creation is tragically marred by the fall of man in Genesis 3, the Old Testament witness affirms that the goodness of the creation still attests to God’s glory. The wisdom literature especially attests to the witness of creation. In Job 38-41, Yahweh’s speech to Job consists nearly entirely of references to the various parts of creation that all attest to Yahweh’s glory and power. The Creation psalms such as Psalm 8 or 19 carry a similar message: “The creation shouts, gossips and exclaims the glory of God in wordless revelation…. Creation cannot help itself but be a continual witness to its creator” (Wilkinson 98). In Psalm 148, creation is even directly commanded to praise Yahweh, and in Proverbs 8, God’s creative acts stand as a testament to his wisdom. This view of creation is not limited to wisdom literature; the prophets also attest to creation’s witness to the glory of God, as in Isaiah 40:9-31.

These passages together indicate the collective understanding of creation in the Old Testament: though creation is cursed because of man’s fall (Gen. 3:17), its witness to the glory of God is not eliminated; indeed, though creation is marred, its inherent goodness is not abrogated by the effects of sin upon the world. In this sense, a parallel can be drawn between the image of God in man and the glory of God in creation. Man was created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27), and that image has been marred but not obliterated by the fall, as is indicated by God’s pronouncement of capital punishment upon murder in Genesis 9:6: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made man.” Man was created by God to be both the capstone of creation and his representative within creation.

As such, we can see that creation shares in the fate of man’s fall; not only is creation cursed because of man’s fall in Genesis 3, but the land itself is cursed or blessed in the Torah based upon the obedience of its inhabitants. The key example of this is the covenantal blessing and cursing found within Deuteronomy 28:

> If you fully obey the Lord your God and carefully follow his commands…The Lord will open the heavens, the storehouse of his bounty, to send rain on your land in season and to bless all the work of your hands…. However, if you do not obey the Lord your God and carefully follow all his commands and decrees…the sky over your head will be bronze, the ground beneath you iron. The Lord will turn the
rain of your country into dust and powder; it will come down from the skies until you are destroyed. (Deut. 28:1, 12, 15, 23-24)

This relationship between obedience and blessing upon the land is confirmed by the prophets, where sin is portrayed as defiling the land; Yahweh declares through Jeremiah, “I brought you into a fertile land to eat its fruit and rich produce. But you came and defiled my land and made my inheritance detestable” (Jer. 2:7). These passages demonstrate that there is a link drawn between the fate of creation and the fate of man, dependent upon man’s sin or obedience. Man’s sin and fall directly affect creation. Bo Reicke tends to see the fall aspect of creation as opposed to the goodness aspect of creation in the Old Testament, creating “ideas about this world that were either positive or negative and could even appear to be contradictory” (351), but imposing a dualistic view of the world upon the witness of the Old Testament seems unnecessary. Taken within the context of the Genesis 3 narrative, the Old Testament provides a joint witness to both the goodness and the fallenness of creation.

This view of creation and its innate goodness is also affirmed within the New Testament. In Matthew 15:11, Jesus teaches that “[w]hat goes into a man’s mouth does not make him ‘unclean,’ but what comes out of his mouth, that is what makes him ‘unclean.’” This statement and its following discussion explanation imply that there is nothing inherently evil about things in creation; rather, it is sin, coming from the heart, which makes one “unclean.” A similar meaning can be inferred from Peter’s vision in Acts 10, in which unclean animals are presented to him to eat. When Peter refuses to eat the unclean animals, the voice speaks to him, “Do not call anything impure that God has made clean” (Acts 10:15). While this passage functions as a metaphor for Peter for the acceptance of Gentiles into the church, it also has a literal principle that can be drawn from it; namely, that what God has created is not of itself unclean. Paul speaks directly to this issue in 1 Timothy: “For everything God created is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with thanksgiving, because it is consecrated by the word of God and prayer” (1 Tim. 4:4-5). In all, the New Testament affirms the same goodness of creation that is affirmed within the Old Testament.

The New Testament does, also, present creation as being affected by sin. Perhaps the clearest passage in the New Testament about creation is Paul’s discussion of creation in Romans 8, which describes creation as having been “subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God” (Rom. 8:20-21). Paul’s statements here both affirm and clarify the Old Testament teaching regarding the impact of sin on creation: creation is innately good, but has been brought into “bondage to decay” by sin, a reminder of the original curse upon the ground in Genesis 3.

In the Old Testament, this curse upon the earth finds redemption in the theme of new creation. As the prophets proclaimed judgment upon Israel and Judah for their sins, they also proclaimed a message of hope and restoration, centered on the renewal of God’s relationship with his people. Thus, Jeremiah speaks of the “new covenant” (Jer. 31:31-37), and Ezekiel promises a “new heart” (Ezek. 18:31) to God’s people. This promise is paralleled in Isaiah with the promise of a new creation, a “new heavens and a new earth” (Isa. 65:17) that carries an eschatological promise for creation:

Behold, I will create a new heavens and a new earth. The former things will not be remembered, nor will they come to mind. But be glad and rejoice forever in what I
create, for I will create Jerusalem to be a delight, and its people a joy. I will rejoice over Jerusalem and take delight in my people; the sound of weeping and crying will be heard in it no more. Never again will there be in it an infant who lives but a few days, or an old man who does not live out his years. The wolf and the lamb will feed together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox, but dust will be the serpent’s food. They will neither harm nor destroy on all my holy mountain. (Isa. 65:17-20, 25)

In this passage, the promise of redemption and blessing upon God’s people is matched by a corresponding blessing and redemption for creation. The redemption of God’s people carries with it the removal of sorrow, the breaking of death’s power, and a reversal of the trends of all creation towards death and decay. Rather than there being constant strife in creation, all will live in harmony on his holy mountain.

A similar section of Isaiah, chapters 24-27, further lays out this cosmic perspective of judgment and redemption. In accord with the curse of Genesis 3, Isaiah 24:5-6 states, “The earth is defiled by its people; they have disobeyed the laws, violated the statutes, and broken the everlasting covenant. Therefore a curse consumes the earth; its people must bear their guilt.” The passage goes on, however, to promise that God will prepare a banquet for his people, a banquet at which “he will destroy the shroud that enfolds all peoples, the sheet that covers all nations; he will swallow up death forever. The Sovereign Lord will wipe away the tears from all faces; he will remove the disgrace of his people from all the earth” (Isa. 25:7-8). Noting both verbal and thematic parallels between this passage and Romans 8, Jonathan Moo argues that this passage may well have influenced Paul’s own understanding of the relationship of humanity and creation in redemption:

A number of thematic parallels with Rom. 8:18–25 may be discerned in this summary, including the suffering of the earth due to the Lord’s punishment of human sin, the personification of creation’s response to judgment, the promise that God’s glory will be revealed, the present waiting of the righteous in expectant hope, the use of birth-pang imagery, the defeat of death, and the possibility of life beyond death. As a result] the emergence in Rom. 8:19–22 of a role for material creation in the context of human suffering and resurrection hope becomes less surprising and less anomalous than is often claimed; it may rarely be the focus of Paul’s concern, but the cosmic and the personal may be for him as inseparably entwined as for the author of Isaiah 24–27. (84-88)

As Moo notes, a key feature of Paul’s thought in Romans 8 is the link drawn between
theology of Creation and Restoration

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The fate of humanity and the fate of the creation. For Paul, “the creation waits in eager expectation for the sons of God to be revealed…in hope that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God” (Rom. 8:19-21). Paul further draws a direct parallel between the “groaning” of creation under its bondage to decay and the “groaning” of humanity in waiting for redemption (Rom. 8:22-23). Moo sums up the implications by noting that

Paul considers material creation itself to be caught up in the drama of salvation by virtue of having its fate tied to humankind…. For Paul, it takes the new human being, Christ, to reverse the effects of this curse and, through his defeat of death, to provide the way for the children of God to enter into God’s glory, the glory intended for Adam. Creation is thus made able to share—as was always intended—in the freedom that pertains to that glory. (88-89)

This comprehensive view of redemption and new creation is not limited to Paul, however. Though the title “new creation” is applied in the New Testament only to believers in 2 Corinthians 5:17, the role of the creation in the new order inaugurated by Christ is stated in several other passages. In Acts 3:21, for example, Peter states that Christ must “remain in heaven until the time comes for God to restore everything, as he promised long ago through his holy prophets.” Ephesians 1:10 also states that “when the times have reached their fulfillment” God will “bring all things in heaven and on earth together under one head, even Christ.” Finally, Colossians 1:19-20 states that God purposed through Christ to “reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on the cross.”

These passages all reference a universal element to redemption, in which God restores, reconciles, or unites “all things” through Christ. J. Richard Middleton cites these and similar passages as teaching that “[f]irst, salvation is conceived, not as God doing something completely new, but rather as re-doing something, fixing or repairing what went wrong, an interpretation that is congruent with the biblical language of restoration, reconciliation, renewal, and redemption. Second, this restorative work is applied as holistically and comprehensively as possible, to all things in heaven and on earth” (90-91). Albert Wolters describes redemption similarly:

The scope of redemption is as great as that of the fall; it embraces creation as a whole. The root cause of all evil on earth—namely, the sin of the human race—is atoned for and overcome in Christ’s death and resurrection, and therefore in principle his redemption also removes all of sin’s effects…. If the whole creation is affected by the fall, then the whole creation is also reclaimed in Christ. (72)

The overall biblical teaching on creation and new creation through both testaments can thus be summed up by observing that creation is created good. Contrary to the teaching of the Gnostics, the material world is inherently good as created by God. The creation is, however, bound up in the fate of humanity, God’s steward of creation. With the rebellion of humanity against God in the fall, creation’s reflection of God becomes tainted but not obliterated by sin. The creation thus remains in “bondage to decay” (Rom. 8:21) until the final glorification and restoration of both humanity and creation at the second coming of Christ.

Since the Bible reveals that creation is bound up in the fate of humanity, further light may be shed upon the new creation theme by examining the redemption and restoration of
humanity through the representative work of Christ. 1 Corinthians 15 in particular draws a contrast between the first Adam, through whose representative actions sin entered the world, and the last Adam, Christ, in whom “all will be made alive” (1 Cor. 15:22). Adam is set up as the representative head of all who would come from him; through his actions all humanity entered into death. Similarly, Christ is the representative head for all who believe in him; through his actions all the elect enter into life. Paul describes Christ as the “firstfruits” of the resurrection: Christ’s resurrection is the proof that Christians will also be raised on the last day to the same sort of existence: “as is the man from heaven, so also are those who are of heaven” (1 Cor. 15:48).

While the contrast Paul draws between the “earthly” and the “heavenly” in 1 Corinthians 15 might seem to indicate that the “heavenly” body is discarnate, Johnson notes that “since the problem for Paul is not with the fleshly material of ‘this age’ per se, but with how sin has corrupted it, there is no compelling reason to imagine that his view of resurrection life is characterized by something other than embodied materiality, possibly even non-corruptible fleshly material” (307). The strong parallel that Paul draws between the resurrection of Christ and the resurrection of the believer adds weight to this statement, for Christ’s resurrected body is presented within the gospels as being clearly material. In eating with his disciples (Luke 24:30, 41-43) and allowing them to touch him (Luke 24:37-40, John 20:27), Jesus demonstrated the material nature of his resurrected body. As N. T. Wright points out, if the disciples had merely seen a vision of a spiritual appearance of Jesus, they would not have stated the idea that he was physically resurrected; such an idea was completely foreign both to the ancient world and to the Jewish culture in which they were immersed. Wright argues, “However many such visions they’d had, they wouldn’t have said Jesus was raised from the dead; they weren’t expecting such a resurrection” (58).

The demonstrated materiality of Christ’s resurrection body has great implications for the doctrines of creation and new creation. The strong parallel that Paul draws between the resurrection of Christ and the resurrection of the believer adds weight to this statement, for Christ’s resurrected body is presented within the gospels as being clearly material. In eating with his disciples (Luke 24:30, 41-43) and allowing them to touch him (Luke 24:37-40, John 20:27), Jesus demonstrated the material nature of his resurrected body. As N. T. Wright points out, if the disciples had merely seen a vision of a spiritual appearance of Jesus, they would not have stated the idea that he was physically resurrected; such an idea was completely foreign both to the ancient world and to the Jewish culture in which they were immersed. Wright argues, “However many such visions they’d had, they wouldn’t have said Jesus was raised from the dead; they weren’t expecting such a resurrection” (58).

The demonstrated materiality of Christ’s resurrection body has great implications for the doctrines of creation and new creation. The physical nature of Christ’s resurrection is an affirmation of the goodness of the material created order. Since Christ was physically resurrected, thus affirming the goodness of creation, it follows that all those who participate in the resurrection of which he is the firstfruits will also be resurrected physically, in a restoration and affirmation of the original created order. The biblical teaching that the fate of creation is linked to the fate of humanity would thus imply that creation will likewise be restored in a material form to its original goodness, with the effects of sin and decay forever reversed in Christ. Andy Johnson argues that within Paul’s original context to affirm
the resurrection of believers would in fact also be to affirm the redemption of creation: “If indeed the *psychikon* body is understood as a microcosm of the cosmos and as having all types of material substance coursing around and through it, to affirm the final redemption of all the human body’s elements would be to affirm the final redemption of all the elements of the cosmic body (and vice versa)” (307).

From this perspective, then, the resurrection of Christ is the single most important event in our understanding of creation and new creation in the Bible. It is an affirmation of the ongoing value of God’s creation within the plan of redemption, and in fact is the event which inaugurates the new heavens and new earth as promised by Isaiah. As Wright points out, “The claim advanced in Christianity is of that magnitude: Jesus of Nazareth ushers in not simply a new religious possibility, not simply a new ethic or a new way of salvation, but a new creation” (67).

This being the case, the resurrection of Christ seems to provide a model for the form of the new creation, as explained by John Polkinghorne:

The equally necessary continuity between the old and new creations lies in the fact that the latter is the redeemed transform of the former. The pattern for this is the resurrection of Christ where…the Lord’s risen body is the eschatological transform of his dead body. This implies that the new creation does not arise from a radically novel creative act *ex nihilo*, but as a redemptive act *ex vetere*, out of the old. (116)

Overall, the biblical themes of creation and new creation seem to indicate not an ethereal spiritual existence for Christians for eternity, nor the dramatic annihilation of the world, to be succeeded by a new universe. 2 Peter 3:5-13 has often been cited as requiring a complete annihilation of the world (“The day of the Lord will come like a thief, in which the elements will pass away with a roar and the elements will be destroyed with intense heat, and the earth and its works will be discovered.”) As Cornelius Venema notes, however, Peter compares this “destruction” to the destruction of Noah’s flood, which did not abolish the world, but rather cleansed it of evil. In addition, the further context of the passage presents an image more of refinement than of annihilation (466-67). The transformation of the world can be seen as well in the vision of Revelation 21:2-3. Rather than ascending up to heaven, the New Jerusalem, the church, descends out of heaven to the new earth. Middleton notes:

Here it is very clear that the final, permanent dwelling place of God with humanity is on earth. Indeed, one chapter later we are told (in Revelation 22:3) that in the New Jerusalem—which has come down from heaven to earth—there will no longer be any curse (Genesis 3 will be finally reversed). Instead, God will be enthroned there (on earth) and God’s servants (according to verse 5) will “reign forever.” (92)

In the end, the biblical themes of creation and new creation point to a new heavens and earth that are not immaterial, but material, not discarnate, but distinctly incarnate. The goodness of creation taught throughout the Bible and affirmed by the resurrection of Christ precludes a Gnostic interpretation of eternity within a purely spiritual realm, while the pattern of redemption and resurrection established by Christ sets a standard of renewal and restoration that apply both to fallen humanity and to fallen creation. As Herman Bavinck notes,

God’s honor consists precisely in the fact that he redeems and renews the same humanity, the same world, the same heaven, and the same earth that have been
corrupted and polluted by sin. Just as anyone in Christ is a new creation in whom the old has passed away and everything become new, so this world passes away in its present form as well, in order out of its womb, at God’s word of power, to give birth and being to a new world. (157)

Bavinck here touches on the key aspect of the new creation theme. It is God’s character that results in the renewal of the heavens and earth. The same God who resurrected Christ will resurrect humanity; the same God who will restores his image bearers in the world will also renew the world in which they are to bear his image. In the end, there can be no distinction made between the God of the Old and New Testaments; the God who redeems the world is the same God who created it, and he is the one who will restore it as a new, transformed creation ex vetere.

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Ordering Chaos in McEwan’s *Atonement*

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*But now was not the time to begin. Briony’s sense of obligation, as well as her instinct for order, was powerful; she must complete what she had initiated...* (McEwan 39)

Briony Tallis is a writer of fiction. She enters the world of Ian McEwan’s novel *Atonement* with her pen drawn, swinging and inking as if to pare the tangle of the world down to a manageable size that might fit on her windowsill or that she might lock in a box beneath her bed. The chaos of the adult world, much less her older sister’s room, is too overpowering for a mind just beginning to suspect the existence of consciousnesses outside her own. The best purchase she can get on a consciousness external to hers is that of glimpsing a dark figure escaping the scene of the crime. Her reception of (or perception of) information is limited and childish. She believes that from scraps of evidence she can order the adult world with all its indecipherable concerns, motives, and instincts. After interrupting a tryst between the young gardener Robbie and her older sister Cecilia, Briony casts Robbie as a character as flat and predictable as those in her highly derivative play *The Trials of Arabella.* After a peer is raped, her first act of adult fiction is her accusation of Robbie as the rapist. Unfortunately for her conscience and Robbie’s freedom, the story Briony writes blurs the line between
fiction and reality. Grown child and toddling author, she tells an unforgivable fairy tale with a sing-song chant: “I saw him. I saw him” (169). Her first attempt at fiction—drawing order out of chaos—only complicates her world. Briony eventually realizes that, in contact with the chaos of the adult world, the monolithic order of the nursery erodes, character details no longer rhyme with the plot, and the writing of fictions can villainize even the author.

Briony’s rudimentary demand for order evinces itself early in the book. By page four of *Atonement*, McEwan reveals that “she was one of those children possessed by the desire to have the world just so.” Her childish sense of order is appalled by the general disarray of her older sister’s room, “a stew of unclosed books, unfolded clothes, unmade bed, unemptied ashtrays” (4, 5). Briony’s room, on the other hand, stands as “a shrine to her controlling demon” (5). Not only is Briony’s the “only tidy room in the house” (5), but she is the only child in the house. The pristine method of her room results from a compulsion to structure and an aversion to disorganization, and consequently the chaotic, adult world. However, the living world is not quite so structured as her room or her fiction.

In stark contrast, her 20-year-old sister, Cecilia, survives in a sea of chaos. Although she is not an author, she is a reader, specifically of Henry Fielding and Samuel Richardson. This taste in adult literature proves her ability to stomach chaos. Richardson, whose *Clarissa* claims honors as the longest novel in English, and Fielding, who spoofed Richardson with *Shamela*, were literary rivals. Cecilia skirts an argument with Robbie over the comparative value of the two authors, preferring not to start “defending, defining, attacking” (25). Although she defers, Cecilia (and Robbie, for that matter) is capable of entertaining diverse viewpoints and pitting them against each other. Their literature evidences the capacity to host the chaos of competing voices. Not only that, but their discussion (or at least avoidance of one) proves they can lift themselves out of the text. Robbie and Cecilia exist outside of the black and white of the printed page. They view fiction through the lens of reality, whereas Briony views reality through the lens of fiction.

Judging by *The Trials of Arabella*, Briony’s works of fiction reveal her tenuous grasp of the figures of the adult world. Briony knows external consciousnesses only through archetypes such as the hazardously passionate heroine or the “wicked foreign count” (3). Only a vague intuition of the adult world suggests to her that the cacophony of competing ideas might be too overpowering for a writer with ears as small as hers. “One could drown in irrelevance,” Briony fears (34). According to critic Peter Mathews, this revelation “creates a break in Briony’s personality, shattering the aesthetic symmetry she had imagined to be at the heart of life and literature, a symmetry that constitutes the foundation of her narcissistic, totalitarian outlook” (155).
The symmetry Mathews suggests is that between Briony’s view of character actions and character essence. Indeed, Briony’s “narcissistic, totalitarian outlook” persuades her to read reality like a book. She operates in the non-fictional world as if some metaphysical author had included enough circumstantial evidence to substantiate her absolutist categories of hero or villain. In a 2007 interview, McEwan said: “If you have your mind set in a certain way, you will see things in a certain way. And Briony is determined that this man, not that, committed this crime. So it’s not the crime itself but how it is perceived through her love of literature and her burning ambition to be a writer” (Lynn). Problems arise when she goes a step farther than merely reading the situation. She assumes an author’s mantle and tragically attempts to story the real world herself.

The chaos begins when Briony watches Robbie’s and Cecilia’s exchange at the fountain. In reality, the two are skirting any substantial discussion, those of the rivalry between Richardson and Fielding or the magnetism between one another. But from her second-story vantage, Briony aligns the scene below with one from her stories in which “a humble woodcutter saved a princess from drowning and ended by marrying her” (36). Once Cecilia begins shedding clothes, apparently at Robbie’s command, Briony realizes more is at play than a simple proposal. Suddenly, Cecilia plunges into the fountain and washes Briony’s fairy tales away. Cecilia has shed her clothes and the “correct, logical order” (22). Critic Pilar Hidalgo points to this moment as Briony’s tectonic shift from “romance to realism” (86). Her immediate inclination is towards a “magical and dramatic” explanation for this lack of order, and she flirts with the idea of supposing the scene to be “a tableau mounted for her alone” (37). Here she fends off the temptation to editorialize on reality, although later she will succumb to it. Returning to the window, Briony finds no evidence of the scene and laments that it exists only in a sliver of memory. In an act of foreshadowing, McEwan writes “the truth had become as ghostly as an invention” (39). Briony cannot help but “complete what she initiated” (39).

It is Robbie’s erotic letter to Cecilia that stretches Briony’s tolerance for adult chaos to the breaking point. McEwan writes, “The very complexity of her feeling confirmed Briony in her view that she was entering an arena of adult emotion and dissembling from which her writing was bound to benefit” (106). Although this new flavor of a more complex world mystifies her, she immediately interprets it as a boon to her writing. Still, Briony struggles to channel these forces and translate them into writing. The letter signifies not only the adult world’s chaos, but also its obscenity, which Briony mistakes for the status quo. She recoils, as Mathews notes, and retreats to her girlish schema (155). Robbie serves as the adult ambassador from a world which Briony rejects, so vehemently in fact that she converts the letter, Mathews says, into the “ammunition she needs to take aim at this destroyer of the aesthetically perfect worlds of her childhood” (155). Briony is caught between the reflexive impulse to pare down the chaotic swarm and the inability to find order in the chaos. Yet, “order must be imposed” (108). Instead she bunkers down in her simplistic world and lobs fiction like artillery at Robbie, the threat to her order.

When she searches Cecilia’s room for the incriminating letter after the initial allegations, Briony wonders at the “squalor and disorder her sister lived in” (166). She misinterprets the chaos of the unscrewed bottles and piled dresses for the chaos of Cecilia’s mind. With an air of maternal pity for Cecilia, Briony admits that there is “something quite hopeless and helpless about her” and finds relief that she, at least, is “thinking clearly, on her behalf”
Further proof that Cecelia has learned to live amid chaos emerges as she arranges flowers before adding water. She thinks to herself, “[N]ot everything people did could be in a correct, logical order, especially when they were alone” (22). Later, in contrast to the social mores of the day, Cecilia and Robbie attempt a premarital tryst in the library, only to be interrupted by Briony’s intrusion. Hidalgo points out that McEwan’s storytelling reverses chronological order (86). Readers learn of Briony’s interruption before Robbie’s recollection of the liaison. Briony interprets the scene as it might appear in one of her novels: a damsel in distress being attacked by a “maniac.” Cecilia’s flowers precede water. Sex precedes marriage. Fiction precedes fact. The letter, the library encounter, and a confusion of adult chaos with juvenile fiction are adequate evidence to fictionalize Robbie’s crime.

The fundamental issue is not that Briony becomes an adult too late but that she becomes an author too soon. She attempts to tackle the chaos of the adult world after only a brief and cryptic encounter via Robbie’s erotic letter. Briony’s first step towards authorship comes at the cost of her self-absorption; she realizes the chaos of two billion voices and retreats within earshot of the one she knows best. Critic Brian Finney believes that “Briony suffers from an inability to disentangle life from the literature that has shaped her life. She imposes the patterns of fiction on the facts of life” (79). Finney surmises that Briony most likely read novels like the plays she wrote: affairs of the “lurid, gothic kind” (79).

McEwan himself pushed this theory in an interview with John Sutherland: “The heroine of Northanger Abbey is a young girl whose head is stuffed with gothic novels, and she misreads the situation in a parallel way. A huge indulgence in literary models by Briony is partly what leads her to make her misjudgement.” Briony makes man in fiction’s image and masks Robbie with a stylized persona lifted from her books. She fictionalizes a culprit with a story, which, according to Finney, “at the time is less a lie than a misconstruction of the adult world she has been observing with the predatory eye of an aspiring novelist” (80). Briony’s instinct for order spurs her on in her misconstruction. She sets her author’s pen aside and allows the chaos of the adult world sweep Robbie away.

Arguably all of fiction is an attempt to draw order out of the chaos. Fiction compresses reality into textual rows which can be visited and revisited at will. In Finney’s words, “All fiction draws attention to its fictionality by insisting on the particularity of the story it is relating while at the same time implying a connection between the private world it is evoking and the public world inhabited by its readers” (77). Fiction connects the impulse for order with the chaos of the common world. Unlike Briony, it orders chaos.
McEwan’s Atonement

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Affective Oddballs: A Psychophysiological Measure of Emotional Picture Viewing

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Abstract

Many event-related potential (ERP) studies have shown a measurable psychophysiological change in the P3 or late positive potential (LPP) component of an ERP within an oddball paradigm. Specifically, increased LPP magnitude is seen in response to less frequent stimuli, or oddballs, when compared to the LPP seen in response to more frequent stimuli, or standards. Affective oddballs, where different emotional stimuli are used to elicit this reaction, have been shown to produce the same change in the LPP. LPP magnitude has been shown to be further enhanced in individuals with higher levels of non-clinical anxiety. The current study aims to extend past findings using complex emotional pictures found in the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) as both standards and oddballs and to analyze results based on individual differences in anxiety and mood. Results show that, typically, when emotional pictures are shown out of context, enhanced LPP magnitude can be seen as expected.
Electroencephalography (EEG) data has been an extremely useful means of measuring physiological responses to stimuli with high temporal resolution. When EEG data is time-locked to a stimulus and averaged over many trials, event-related potential (ERP) data emerges to give information about brain activity in response to specific stimuli. The ERP waves have several important components, including the P300, or positive wave inflection that occurs about 300 ms after stimulus onset. The P300 has also been lumped in with a more broad late positive potential (LPP) that begins approximately 300 ms after stimulus onset and extends as long as 1000 ms after stimulus onset, especially in emotional studies where stimuli are presented very rapidly (Schupp et al., 2000; Cacioppo et al., 1993; Cacioppo et al., 1994). It has been speculated that this wave component reflects a categorization or context-updating process in the brain (e.g., Delplanque et al., 2005). This component therefore has important implications in emotional studies and in situations where novel stimuli occur.

Schupp et al. (2000) demonstrated that, when emotional pictures were viewed at random, ERP data showed a significantly enhanced magnitude in the LPP component of the waveforms in response to more emotionally extreme pictures (pleasant or unpleasant) as compared to neutral pictures. Also discovered was that affective pictures that were more arousing tended to elicit a larger LPP amplitude. These two findings complement each other since more emotionally extreme pictures tend to be more arousing as well, so the same increase in LPP amplitude is seen for both more arousing pictures and more emotionally extreme pictures, compared to low arousal neutral pictures.

The oddball paradigm also uses EEG measures. In it, a stream of stimuli are presented in which one type of stimulus occurs less frequently than another. For instance, if a constant stream of geometric shapes flashing on a screen features two triangles interspersed with fifteen circles, the less frequent stimulus (the triangle) would be serving as an oddball, whereas the more frequent stimulus (the circle) would be serving as a standard, or context.

When this affective picture viewing paradigm is paired with the oddball paradigm, the LPP amplitude is further enhanced in response to the novel stimuli. Cacioppo et al. (1993, 1994) demonstrated the effects of these affective oddball stimuli using emotional trait adjectives, where words of one emotion would serve as the standard stimuli, establishing an emotional context, and words of another emotion would occur less frequently and serve as context-inconsistent oddballs. Responses to the affective oddball in ERP data showed increased amplitude for the LPP waveform component, showing that oddballs can be achieved contextually. That is, the oddball paradigm was demonstrated when all stimuli were visually different, but processing differences based on emotional or semantic value set them apart.

Another affective oddball study used pictures of facial expressions as standards and oddballs, where facial expressions ranged from fearful to sad (Campanella et al., 2002). Standard pictures would be faces of one emotional category and the accompanying oddballs would be faces of another emotional category or, at times, a different facial expression of the same emotional category. The results were consistent with past results in affective oddball studies and extended knowledge to include a delayed response in the N2/P3a component when oddballs depicted the same emotion as the context. The study also demonstrated that emotional faces can elicit the affective oddball effect, not just words.
Delplanque et al. (2005) used geometric figures as standard stimuli and IAPS images of varying valences (i.e., pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) as oddballs. This study focused on separate analyses of the P3a and P3b components of a wave, but in general also found that oddball stimuli tend to evoke higher amplitudes in the P3. Specifically, results showed that the P3b was found to respond to arousal and valence of images, where higher arousal images and images closer to emotional extremes would elicit higher amplitudes.

Rossignol et al. (2005, 2007) investigated how ERP responses to emotional stimuli were modulated by individual differences in non-clinical anxiety. In two separate studies, images of facial expressions (anger and disgust in one, fear and happiness in the other) were presented in an oddball paradigm. Findings included not only the typical P3 amplitude increase for oddballs, but also a further enhanced P3 in individuals with higher levels of non-clinical anxiety, compared to those with lower levels of anxiety.

The current study aims to replicate and extend past affective oddball findings using all complex emotional stimuli—specifically, images from the IAPS photo set. Past work in Dr. Bruce Cuthbert’s laboratory has shown that a constant stream of emotional pictures of the same valence can induce a mood-like state. Using images of one valence to induce a context and images of another valence to serve less frequently as oddballs, it was hypothesized that there would be an increase in the LPP amplitude of oddball images compared to standard images. Also, using non-clinical measures of anxiety and mood, researchers hope to analyze individual differences and find that those with higher levels of anxiety tend to have larger LPP amplitudes relative to those with lower levels of anxiety. A last research aim is to analyze a picture recognition task, where participants indicate whether a picture was presented before in the picture viewing blocks out of a pool of pictures, some of which have been seen and some of which have not. Here, it is hypothesized that participants might tend to recognize oddball pictures more frequently than standard pictures due to the higher level of brain activity and attention devoted to oddballs, as seen in the enhanced LPP.

Method

Participants

Participants included 13 undergraduate students (11 female, 2 male) with an average age of 20.16. Students were recruited from introductory psychology classes at the University of Minnesota and from summer programs taking place on the University of Minnesota campus. Participants were excluded if they had been treated for past psychiatric illness or if they were currently taking any psychoactive drugs. If participants had corrected vision, they were instructed to wear glasses rather than contact lenses during the picture-viewing task. Introductory psychology students were compensated with extra credit.

Materials

Six questionnaires were computer-administered and used to assess anxiety and mood: the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; used both State and Trait), the Emotionality, Activity, Sociability, & Impulsivity scale (EASI), the Fear Survey Schedule (FSS), and the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ).
EEG data was acquired with 128-channel Hydrocel Geodesic Sensor Nets, along with EEG amplification and processing hardware and Net Station software (Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR). E-Prime image presentation software was also used during the picture viewing and picture rating/recognition tasks (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Pictures used during experimentation all came from the IAPS photo set.

Design

Six experimental blocks of pictures were used for each participant, with each picture valence serving as a standard twice and as an oddball twice. Aside from valence, pictures were also sorted by arousal. High and medium arousal standards were used for unpleasant and pleasant standard blocks. Low and medium arousal standards were used for neutral standard blocks. Standard pictures were split evenly between the two arousal levels. Unpleasant and pleasant oddballs were all high arousal, while neutral oddballs were low arousal (see Tables 1 and 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Six picture blocks by valence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Oddball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant</td>
<td>Unpleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Pleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Unpleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpleasant</td>
<td>Pleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpleasant</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valence arousals within blocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low/Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High/Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within blocks, placement of oddballs was random so that participants could not learn to expect them. However, oddballs always had at least two standards between them. Overall, each block consisted of 160 pictures, with a four-to-one ratio of standards to oddballs. The presentation orders of the six experimental picture blocks were also randomized to control for ordering effects.

Pictures were preceded by a crosshair fixation for 300 ms, and the pictures themselves were shown on the screen for 700 ms. Each block therefore had a duration of 160 seconds.

Procedure

Upon completion of consent forms, participants filled out a prescreening form that provided background information and served to filter out those with a history of psychiatric illness or recent consumption of psychoactive drugs. After the participants’ heads were measured for net size, they completed the six computer-administered questionnaires.

Participants were escorted to a different room and seated in a padded recliner. The vertex of each participant’s head was marked and measured with a china marker. After the net had been soaking in a solution of KCl and baby shampoo for five minutes, the net was
Affective Oddballs

placed on the participants. Impedances were checked and corrected where possible on the net before picture viewing began. Participants were given their instructions and reclined. The lights in the room were turned out except for a small lamp, and the monitor that served for image presentation was placed on a table directly over the reclined participants’ shins to ensure a comfortable viewing distance.

A practice block of pictures was shown first, and participants were allowed to ask any questions or address any concerns. The six experimental blocks were then presented, with a break in between each block to measure and save impedance values. Trouble electrodes were rewetted after the first, third, and fifth blocks of pictures.

The net was removed from the participants’ heads, the lights were turned on, and participants were given the instructions for completing the picture ratings and recognition tasks. Finally, participants were debriefed and dismissed.

Results

To assess the differences in LPP amplitude, each subject’s data in each category was averaged. A grand average was taken for graphing purposes. Each block was analyzed separately, where P – u stands for the block with pleasant standards and unpleasant oddballs, N – p stands for the block with neutral standards and pleasant oddballs, etc. Data was analyzed in the program JMP, where MANOVAs were used to check for significant differences between categories in each block. Therefore, each of the six MANOVA’s compared three different groups—the oddballs and the two different arousal levels of the standards. Where significant differences were found, post-hoc two-tailed t-tests were used to find specific significant differences between the three categories of picture in each block.

In waveform figures such as Figure 1a, the y-axis is a scale of 0 – 6.0 μV, and the x-axis is from 0 – 1 s. Picture onset occurs 100 ms after the 0 s mark, and the fixation replaces the picture at 800 ms. In Figure 1a, the LPP, beginning around 300 ms after picture onset (or 400 ms on the x-axis), visually stands out in the oddball above the two standard categories in the N – u block. When statistical analysis is run on the data, a significant difference is seen between the oddball and both standard arousal categories ($F = 8.30, p < .05$). The low and medium arousal standard categories did not statistically differ. These results are expected because the unpleasant oddballs are not only getting extra attention in the brain due to the oddball effect, but they are also high arousal compared to the low and medium arousal neutral standards.
Figure 1a. Grand-averaged waveform for N–u block.

Mean LPP Amplitude for the N-u Block

Figure 1b. Mean LPP amplitudes for N–u block, where asterisks denote significant differences between picture types.
The waveform of the P – n block shows something very interesting. The neutral oddballs, all of which are low arousal, exhibit an LPP amplitude comparable to that of high arousal pleasant standard images. Both pleasant high arousal standards and neutral oddballs visually have higher LPP amplitudes than the medium arousal pleasant standards. This effect, seen in Figure 2a, clearly demonstrates the attention-related boost an oddball receives in the brain, measured by the LPP. In a normal, random assortment of pictures, one would expect low arousal pictures such as the oddball here to have an LPP amplitude lower than that of both medium and high arousal pictures. In fact, the Figure 2b shows that the low arousal neutrals are not significantly different from either of the relatively higher arousal standard categories. The only significant difference lies between the high standards and medium standards ($F = 7.22, p < .05$), but the actual value for the low arousal oddballs falls between the medium and high standard values.

![Figure 2a](image)

*Figure 2a.* Grand-averaged waveform for P – n block.
Results for all the blocks are displayed in Table 3. The P – u block had no significant differences between any of the groups. This is not terribly surprising since the unpleasant oddballs and half the pleasant standards were high arousal (the other half being medium arousal). The high arousal property of the entire block competed with the oddball effect here. However, looking at the individual values, data did trend in the way that was expected, where high arousal oddballs had the highest mean amplitude, high arousal standards came next, and medium arousal standards followed last.

The N – p block also showed no significant difference between any of the groups, which is somewhat more surprising. The low and medium arousal standards should pale in comparison to high arousal oddballs. In actuality, the data does show a trend in that direction, but variability is currently too large for results to be significant.

The U – p block is another block full of very arousing pictures. Significant difference was achieved between the high arousal oddballs and the medium arousal standards. High arousal oddballs did have a higher mean LPP amplitude than high arousal standards, but once again the difference due to the oddball effect was not enough to overcome the matched arousal levels and create a significant difference.

Results in the U – n block are more complicated and seem to defy explanation. The medium arousal standards have a significantly higher amplitude than either the high arousal standards or the low arousal oddballs. Future sampling and research may lead to more congruent data or better explanations for such surprising results.

Figure 2b. Mean LPP amplitudes for P – n block, where asterisks denote significant differences between picture types.
Table 3
LPP amplitude means, F values, and significance values for each experimental block.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Standard 1</th>
<th>Standard 2</th>
<th>Oddball</th>
<th>F Value</th>
<th>P Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-n</td>
<td>2.71a</td>
<td>3.58b</td>
<td>3.10ab</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-u</td>
<td>2.85a</td>
<td>3.11a</td>
<td>3.52a</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-p</td>
<td>2.58a</td>
<td>2.87a</td>
<td>3.61a</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-u</td>
<td>2.16a</td>
<td>2.50a</td>
<td>3.59b</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-n</td>
<td>3.92a</td>
<td>3.30b</td>
<td>2.92b</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-p</td>
<td>3.29a</td>
<td>3.58ab</td>
<td>3.98b</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subscripts serve to indicate significance, where values sharing a letter are not significantly different. The “Standard 1” category refers to the standard pictures of the lower arousal category in each block.

Discussion

For the most part, the data clearly show that affective oddballs in a different emotional context can trigger a larger LPP amplitude than they would if presented with the same frequency as the standard. Higher arousal pictures do capture the brain’s attention and result in more neuron firing, something that can also be seen in the LPP data, but even low arousal pictures can achieve an LPP amplitude comparable to that of a high arousal picture solely because it acts as an oddball. Thus, the oddball effect was clearly demonstrated using complex emotional stimuli from the IAPS photo set.

Of particular interest is the P – n block data, which show a clear enhancement of low arousal LPP magnitude to the point that it is comparable with a high arousal pleasant standard. The low arousal picture had nothing else to boost this measure other than the fact that it stood out as an oddball. Participants were able to automatically discriminate neutral oddballs from pleasant standards.

Even where significant results were not achieved, trends in the data usually go in the direction of the hypothesis. One limitation of this experiment was the small sample size. Only 13 subjects have currently been run out of the 48 expected by the time the study is truly over. With a larger sample size, more accurate data, less error, and subsequently more significant results will be achievable.

There were also some limitations within the IAPS photo selection process. While high arousal unpleasant pictures abound in the photo set to increase the affective distance from the neutrals, the pleasant valence seems to lack as many extremely high arousal pictures. This is due to the number of pleasant things that are not very arousing in the photo set, such as scenery, food, calm water, etc. So, in the end, some higher arousal pictures in the unpleasant valence actually had to be replaced with lower arousal pictures just to statistically match the arousals between the unpleasant and pleasant picture pools. Also, there were not very many neutral pictures to choose from simply because the neutral valence lies in the middle and tends to blur into the other two valences fairly quickly. Trying to work within a limited photo set and choose pictures that had suitable ratings along two different dimensions (valence...
and arousal) proved quite difficult at times. Nonetheless, the normative arousal levels of the pleasant and unpleasant pictures were able to be matched, both of which significantly differ from neutrals. Also, statistically distinct valence categories were able to be created using normative valence ratings.

Future research goals include linking questionnaire data on anxiety and mood with these ERP findings. Individual differences based on measures of non-clinical anxiety and mood could lead to possible clinical applications, where this method could be used to aid in diagnosis or to evaluate treatment for anxiety and mood disorders. Having a physiological measurement for such assessment and evaluation could prove invaluable to clinicians.

Another future goal in this experiment is to analyze the recognition task data. It is currently hypothesized that subjects will recognize oddballs more accurately than they will standards, possibly with some arousal effects playing a part as they did in our current analysis.

References


The Protocol Debate:
Do the Details Matter?

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Introduction

Rudolf Carnap’s work The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language is no doubt one of the most well-known essays of the logical positivist movement. In this piece, Carnap embarks on the audacious project of applying logic to the language of metaphysicians in order to test whether or not the statements are meaningful. His overarching aim is to clarify “the cognitive content of statements and thereby the [cognitive] meanings of the terms that occur in the statements, by means of logical analysis…” (136). This general aim has two results, one positive and one negative. The positive result, not discussed at length in The Elimination of Metaphysics, would be to clarify the concepts in the various branches of the natural sciences and make “their formal-logical and epistemological connections” explicit (136). In other words, Carnap believes his project is to unify the empirical sciences by giving them a common foundation. The debate over empiricism as an epistemology has been raging for centuries, and it seems as though Carnap and the Vienna Circle simply assume this position. The sense in which the term “empiricism” is taken in this essay will be forthcoming.

The negative result of Carnap’s project, on which this treatise is focused, is the reduction of the study of metaphysics to a series of cognitively meaningless statements or pseudo-statements. He rejects both the terms used by metaphysics and their syntactical arrangements in metaphysical works as completely devoid of meaning. As we will see, the success of these
aims is predicated on the success of both an empiricist epistemology and protocol sentences. An understanding of protocol sentences is not, as Carnap suggests, inconsequential to the success of his project.

**Empiricism in the Vienna Circle**

In defining the sense in which the chief members of the Vienna Circle were empiricists, one must be careful to not simply identify Carnap and the others with all of the empiricist epistemologies that went before. The "logical empiricists" saw empiricism as undergoing something of an attack, and their response self-consciously molded empiricism into a new, perhaps somewhat looser formulation (Uebel, *Empiricism* 1-2). We must recognize as well that not all of the members of the Vienna Circle were committed to the exact same epistemological views. This is apparent in their treatments of protocol sentences.

Nevertheless, the Vienna Circle could very justifiably be described as empiricist. However, its members were only empiricist in the sense that they rejected *a priori* foundationalism, or the attempt to ground all knowledge in philosophical inquiry. Carnap remarks on this topic in *The Unity of Science*:

> Our views are related, in a similar fashion, to those of *Empiricism*, since we follow that theory so far as to reject *a priori* judgments; Logical Analysis shows that every statement is either empirically verifiable (i.e. on the basis of protocol statements), analytic, or self contradictory. On this account, we have at times been classified, both by ourselves and by others, as Empiricists. (27-28)

Everything we know, according to Carnap and the logical empiricists, is known on either empirical or logical grounds (Uebel, *Empiricism* 14). The term "analytic" means here simply what is proven true through the utilization of formal-logical processes or methodology. However, logic is a description of the processes of the mind, which as such is available for psychological (i.e. scientific) scrutiny. For Carnap, “Every psychological sentence refers to physical occurrences in the body of the person (or persons) in question” (Carnap, *Psychology in Physical Language* 197). In this sense, logical truths could also be considered empirical. This is important to understand Carnap’s following statement:

> A statement asserts only so much as is verifiable with respect to it. Therefore, a sentence can be used only to assert an empirical proposition, if indeed it is used to assert anything at all. If something were to lie, in principle, beyond possible experience, it could be neither said nor thought nor asked. (Carnap, *Elimination* 145 [emphasis mine])

Nothing outside of our empirical experience is capable of even being thought by a human mind. Carnap is very clear, and speaks for the Circle in saying that “knowledge cannot be
Protocol Sentences: Do The Details Matter?

Protocol sentences are the means by which we link our statements about the world to world itself. Protocol sentences, whatever form, are supposed to be those statements that most closely refer to the empirical data (Quine 230), thereby grounding the meaning of the words in sense data and upholding the empiricist epistemology (Schlick 209). They are the elementary statements from which all other meaningful statements are derived. A word is only meaningful for Carnap insofar as it is reducible to “words which occur in the so-called ‘observation sentences’ or ‘protocol sentences’” (Elimination 137). He explains these criteria further when he says, “[I]t is certain that a sequence of words has a meaning only if its relations of deducibility to the protocol sentences are fixed…and similarly, that a word is significant only if the sentences in which it may occur are reducible to protocol sentences” (Elimination 138; cf. Carnap, On Protocol 86).

Despite their centrality to the meaningfulness of statements, Carnap does not believe that the exact form or content of the protocol sentences is particularly important. He acknowledges that a debate is still under way concerning the form and content of these protocol sentences when he says that “the primary sentences refer to ‘the given’; but there is no unanimity on the question what it is that is given” (Elimination 138). Nevertheless, Carnap says that this is the criteria for meaning of a word, “whatever the characteristics of a protocol sentence may be” (Elimination 138). Given that this theory of meaning is central to his negative claim, Carnap seems to imply that the specifics of protocol sentences are not necessary to carry out the elimination of metaphysics. Similarly, concerning his positive aim of unifying the sciences, Carnap writes, “In the present state of research it is not possible to characterize this language [of protocol-language] with greater precision, i.e., to specify its vocabulary, syntactical forms and rules. This is, however, unnecessary for the subsequent arguments of this paper” (The Unity of Science 45). Carnap makes it abundantly clear that neither of his goals is affected by the precise nature of protocol sentences.

However, the contention of this essay is that the nature of these sentences is, in fact, important to his success in achieving these aims. It is clear even to Carnap that protocol sentences must be valid if his physicalist epistemology is to be valid. He writes, “For physicalism it is especially urgent to justify protocol sentences and thereby the experiential foundation of science. This is where most doubt about physicalism begins, and indeed it is the really critical point for this view” (On Protocol Sentences 81). Moritz Schlick agrees that the implications of the debate on protocol sentences are far reaching: “The problem of ‘protocol statements,’ their structure and function, is the latest form in which the philosophy or rather the decisive empiricism of our day clothes the problem of the ultimate ground of knowledge” (209). Moreover, the distinctive characteristics of the different forms of protocol sentences may reveal different epistemologies and/or linguistic theories and thereby affect Carnap’s project of debunking metaphysics and giving epistemic ground to the natural sciences.
Protocol Sentences: The Debate

Three main views on the specifics of protocol sentences have been proposed by Carnap, Schlick, and Otto Neurath. Carnap’s view is that protocol sentences refer to the given which is the basic quality of sense impressions (Elimination 138; On Protocol Sentences 81-87; Quine 230). Examples of such a protocol sentences might be “Now joy,” or “Now red circle,” or “A red die is lying on the table” (Neurath 202). Neurath’s view, on the other hand, is that protocol sentences refer to the relation between the one who perceives and the object of perception (Quine 230; Neurath 202). W.V.O. Quine’s example is slightly inaccurate but is adequate for our purposes: “Otto now sees a red cube on the table” (230). Both of these are predicated on the sense impressions of an individual. Schlick’s view is more rigorously physicalist. He believes that protocol sentences refer directly to material things, the external world (Carnap, Elimination 138; Quine 230).

Carnap

First, let us discuss Carnap’s own view of protocol sentences. This is the view that protocol sentences refer to the given, which speaks of “the simplest qualities of sense and feeling (e.g., “warm,” “blue,” “joy,” and so forth)” (Elimination 138). In Carnap’s approach, the form of protocol sentences is somewhat arbitrary because the protocol sentences are outside the system. They are the basis for the system and are brought into the system by a set of rules by which they can be translated into system sentences (On Protocol 82). The protocol sentence is uttered by a person in response to a particular situation. The protocol sentence reveals not a thing, but a process of perception (On Protocol 83). Carnap writes, “In the examples discussed so far translation rules lead from protocol sentences to sentences which refer to things in the environment of the man in question; here we speak of ‘T-rules’ and ‘T-sentences’” (On Protocol 84). So we see that protocol sentences do not refer to things but processes, and are translated into T-sentences, which refer to things. However, the protocol sentence can only be translated if the outside conditions under which it is uttered can be ascertained and stated in the system language (i.e., scientific language) (On Protocol 86).

If a word must be deducible to its use in a protocol sentence to have any meaning, and that protocol sentence may admit of words like “joy,” then what of Carnap’s own distinction between cognitive meaning and emotive, expressive, non-cognitive meaning? He claims that the use of the term “meaning” in this paper is always in reference to cognitive meaning.
Thus, a word deducible to its use in a protocol sentence has cognitive meaning. However, using the word “joy” in a protocol sentence would seem to render an emotive meaning. Carnap does parry this objection in a piece entitled “Psychology in Physical Language.” He writes, “Our thesis thus states that a definition may be constructed for every psychological concept (i.e., expression) which directly or indirectly derives that concept from physical concepts” (167). He believes that a psychological concept refers to some bodily process, either in the central or peripheral nervous system, and in so doing qualifies as a physical concept reducible to protocol sentences. “Joy, here, now,” could, under this framework, be translated into a T-sentence such as, “At 9:35 p.m. there are high levels of serotonin and dopamine being left in the synaptic gaps based on the insufficient ability of the neurons to reuptake all of the neurotransmitters.”

This seeming conflation of meaning has real implications for his project of debunking metaphysics. Carnap’s footnote is careful to point out that the “thesis that the sentences of metaphysics are meaningless . . . is thus to be understood in the sense that they have no cognitive meaning, no assertive content. The obvious psychological fact that they have expressive meaning is thereby not denied” (Elimination 136). In fact, he explicitly states in section 7 that “metaphysics does indeed have a content,” which is “the expression of the general attitude of a person towards life” (Elimination 146). However, by his own standard of protocol sentences, one’s expressive content may also be assertive, being that protocol sentences cannot but be assertive. “Now anxiety” or “Now despair” would be arguably as much a protocol sentence as “Now joy,” which is properly physicalistic, according to Carnap, and is the same type of statement as “Now red.” Due to this allowance of “psychological perception” in the category of the given, Carnap is practically required to allow the “attitude” of the metaphysician in the category of having cognitive content.

However, for the project of unifying the sciences I have fewer objections to Carnap’s rendition of protocol sentences. His argument for unification of psychology with the physical sciences is compelling, although it is a bit idealistic and rules out all but behaviorist psychology. However, it does not ground the sciences in anything beyond the perceptions of people. We can perhaps methodically compare the perceptions of individuals to approximate an answer closer to the “fact,” but we would still be dealing with approximations. There is an essential gap between the perception and the object of perception, which is even implicit in Carnap’s choice of defining protocol sentences as sense impressions instead of the objects of sense impressions (as does Schlick). That being said, that is an external critique Carnap would probably not allow, as his epistemology does not accept the existence of anything behind the phenomenal experience.

Moving on to Otto Neurath’s view, one notices a uniqueness right away. Neurath takes Carnap’s example of protocols to be incomplete. He argues that protocol sentences must contain the personal noun (202), indicating that the perception of the individual cannot but be a factor in the observation of the external world (205). One person’s perception is and must be distinguished from the perception of another, with the implication being that Otto’s perception of object A at 9:35 p.m. may be (at least slightly) different from another person’s perception of the same object at the same time. However, under this system there is no sentence saying, “I perceived such and such at this time.” Everyone’s perception,
including one’s own, is on a par. He writes, “But Neurath must describe Neurath’s protocol in a manner analogous to that in which he describes Kalon’s,” where Kalon represents any other person (207).

Neurath’s approach has come to be recognized as actually anti-foundationalist by some contemporary scholars (Uebel, “Protocols, Affirmations” 297) in the sense that the protocol sentences themselves are part of the system and are subject to verification and that verification thus seems to be coherence as opposed to a Schlick-like correspondence theory of truth (Neurath 207; cf. Uebel, Empiricism 305-6). Recall that for Carnap, protocol sentences are outside of the system, translated into system language through a set of rules. In fact, what he calls “B-rules” translate the protocols into “B-sentences” that refer to the person or thing perceiving in much the same way as Neurath’s protocol sentences (Carnap, “On Protocol” 84). Neurath’s approach assures that protocol sentences are system sentences, and such refer to totalities of a given experience at particular points in space-time. This renders protocol sentences subject to verification, and the reduction to protocol sentences can no longer be the verification criteria for the meaning of a particular word or sentence. In fact, in Neurath’s understanding, protocol sentences themselves can be thrown out if found to be unverifiable. Neurath distinguishes himself from Carnap in saying, “We also allow for the possibility of discarding protocol sentences. A defining condition of a sentence is that it be subject to verification” (204). However, Carnap’s protocol sentences are the basic units, outside the system, synonymous with the verification criteria and unable to be verified themselves (because verification does not apply to itself).

The question to be raised here is how an anti-foundationalist view of protocol sentences can continue to uphold such a rigorous definition of meaning. Both the foundation for science and the elimination of metaphysics are, for Carnap, predicated on the reducibility of system language to physicalistic protocol sentences. The epistemic value of the system language is proportional to its reducibility to protocol language. However, under Neurath’s anti-foundationalist approach, an approach that assumes a verification method and criteria to which protocol sentences are subject, there is no ground from which to build the positive or negative projects that Carnap is attempting.

Moreover, it seems as though there is quite a bit of subjectivity inherent in this understanding of protocols, and as such it would have no place making universal statements inherent in an empiricist epistemology. If a protocol statement were, “Otto sees a demon at 9:35 o’clock,” on what basis might one critique Otto’s vision? One’s own vision? Otto’s vision is distinguished from that of all other individuals. If this perspective on protocol
sentences were adopted, Carnap’s aforementioned statement concerning the meaninglessness of metaphysics due to its failure to ground itself in empirical data, could be rendered null and void, because protocol sentences would not be properly inter-subjective. Neurath does have a reply to this argument from solipsism. As aforementioned, Neurath assesses Neurath’s protocols in the same way he assesses Kalon’s. He likens it to throwing all of the various protocols into some unbiased, protocol sorting machine (207). He writes, “Anyone may test his own protocol sentences as well as those of others” (207). However, in my view this is impossible.

It is impossible because we have only indirect access to the protocols of others. They are either written or spoken by X and subsequently perceived and understood by Y. In order to understand X’s perception, Y must form and accept a protocol sentence concerning her perception of the protocol sentence of X. Only then can she test X’s protocol. So, in testing X’s protocol, Y is inherently accepting her own protocol relative to the perception of X’s protocol. Therefore, Neurath’s claim—“The fact that men generally retain their own protocol sentences more obstinately than they do those of other people is a historical accident which is of no real significance for our purposes”—is completely misguided. It is no historical accident. The retention of one’s own protocol sentences is inherently part of the process of testing the protocol sentences of others. This shows that Neurath cannot adequately defend himself against the charges of solipsism, and therefore his definition of protocol sentences cannot be used to ground Carnap’s projects of the elimination of metaphysics or the unification of the sciences.

Schlick

Moritz Schlick’s strict correspondence theory of truth looks at first to be very promising for founding the sciences. He believes that protocol sentences refer directly to facts about the external world, or objects. Although there is substantial debate among scholars as to whether or not Schlick actually was a foundationalist, it seems that his position as understood here by Carnap and also by Quine is that protocol sentences are directly causally linked to the physical world in the sense that they are statements of facts about the physical world. This would appear to be a description of facts independent of a perceiver. It is a description of a “real world out there.” According to Thomas Oberdan, Schlick “formulated the idea that the truth of scientific statements is determined by comparing protocols with the facts.” Schlick, at least originally, believed that “What was originally meant by ‘protocol statements,’ as the name indicates, are those statements which express the facts with absolute simplicity, without any moulding, alteration or addition, in whose elaboration every science consists, and which precede all knowing, every judgment regarding the world” (210).

If it were tenable, this position would, I believe, cause little trouble for Carnap’s thesis and aims. However, the only difficulty would perhaps reside in the description of the link between the external world and these protocol sentences. If Neurath’s explicit linkage of percipients and perception is rejected, it is difficult to see how one would connect external world “in closest causal proximity” (Quine 230) to the protocols. This is hardly an insignificant matter to Carnap’s project, because there is some doubt of the plausibility of such a direct linkage between protocol sentence and objective fact.

Even if the protocol sentences “express the facts with absolute simplicity,” one must take into account that they are expressions of the facts, not the facts themselves. One must
ask the question how the facts themselves can be known if they cannot even be expressed. Schlick is right to assert, “If we succeed therefore in expressing the raw facts in ‘protocol statements,’ without any contamination, these appear to be the absolutely indubitable starting points of all knowledge” (210). However, the question is whether or not the antecedent of this statement is possible. Is it possible to express pure fact about something outside oneself without contamination by the self that is perceiving and subsequently expressing it? This is very doubtful, and it is the precise reason for Neurath’s inclusion of the percipient in protocol sentence itself. It seems that on these bases then, Schlick’s view is not actually useful for the unifying of science or elimination of metaphysics because it is so idealistic in its presentation. It fails at providing a link from knowledge of the facts to facts themselves, but rather just assumes the link could exist in the conscious expression of the perceiver. If it cannot provide this link, it fails its own tests as a correspondence theory of truth.

**Conclusion**

It seems that although Carnap is convinced that the precise form and content of protocol sentences are irrelevant to his aims of eliminating metaphysics and grounding and unifying the natural sciences, we have seen that the details in fact do matter. Carnap’s own view of protocols is perhaps the most internally consistent, although it still presents problems as far as rejecting certain emotive claims of metaphysics as cognitively meaningless. Neurath’s particular anti-foundationalism and ensuing problem with a certain type of solipsism make his particular approach not only useless for Carnap’s projects, but internally untenable from an inter-subjective, physicalistic perspective. Schlick’s view seems not to be able to provide a link between the knowledge and the fact, which is necessary in a strict correspondence theory of truth.

Is there a solution to this problem? Could there exist a protocol sentence that would allow for the success of Carnap’s major projects and effectively ground all human knowledge? It is unlikely. We have seen theories of protocol sentences that roughly fall into three main categories: objective statements about perceptions (Carnap), objective statements about the real world (Schlick), and subjective statements about perceptions (Neurath). These are the only three potentially viable options under this type of empiricist epistemology. The conclusion of this paper is that at least this type of empiricism is doomed to fail. There is no way to find “the absolutely indubitable starting points of all knowledge” (Schlick 210) under this system. Uebel is right in his assessment: “The point at issue throughout was to keep talk of meaning related to an empirical basis. Of course, that these reductive claims were too strong…turned out, in the end, to be independent of just what ‘the given’ was conceived to consist of” (“Writing a Revolution” 96).

Perhaps in trying to ground our knowledge in either a priori or a posteriori reasoning, but not both, we have left out a middle ground. Perhaps there is a relationship between certain categories of perception and certain a priori notions that could provide solid ground on which to build a theory of knowledge. However, to some degree, we will always have to trust that the foundation we accept gives us true knowledge because we are only the type of knowers that we are. We cannot have outside, unbiased, empirical knowledge of our own knowledge that corroborates its accuracy to the Truth. There is, on this foundational level, no substitute for faith, and, for the Christian, the testimony of the Holy Spirit.


Abandonment and Decay in East Tennessee

By DANIEL AISENBREY

Carson-Newman College
Tennessee Delta
Jefferson City, Tennessee

Daniel Aisenbrey presented this photo exhibit at the 2009 national convention.

Asheville Highway, silver gelatin print, 10” x 10”, 2009
Baker Road, silver gelatin print, 10” x 10”, 2009

Talbott-Kansas Road, silver gelatin print, 8” x 10”, 2008
Mt. Horeb Road, silver gelatin print, 10” x 8”, 2008

Talbott-Kansas Road, silver gelatin print, 10” x 8”, 2008
Letters to the Editor

Editor:

As a member of Alpha Chi, I read with great interest the “Short Takes” in the Alumni Issue of the Recorder, 2009, “Eleven Books That Changed Our Worlds.” I found the essay by Prof. Samuel B. Hoff on the book . . . The Federalist of special importance. Prof. Hoff outlines the discussion in the book between the Founding Fathers of our nation, when the American Constitution was up for ratification.

The fact that our Constitution survived many crises and will endure through any foreseeable challenges makes The Federalist truly a book of worthwhile reading. I would like to congratulate you on your selection of this book.

Thank you very much!

Rose Schmeckenbecher
North Chili, N.Y.
Active Alumna, 1994, Marist College

Editor:

I just got--and just read--the most recent Alpha Chi Recorder / Alumni Issue. Kudos on a great job with this! Every piece in this issue was of interest--literacy (for obvious reasons), conventions (because that’s what I do so much of), “secrets of an All-Star Professor” (as someone with the title “Distinguished Teaching Professor” these things are always of interest), honors experiences (what can I say--26 years as Executive Director of Sigma Tau Delta preceded by six years as Honors Director, presidency of the Midwest Honors Council, etc. and etc.)--and those 11 books that changed our world, some of which were shaping forces in my youth, and a few reminders, among those I haven’t read, that there are still important things to read before I cash it all in.

Thanks for the great work on this and for providing stimulating, exciting, informed readings!

William C. Johnson
Northern Illinois University
Executive Director
Sigma Tau Delta, International English Honor Society

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