The Panamanian Crucible: Manuel Noriega, The Reagan Doctrine, and The U.S. Invasion of Panama

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Abstract

At the beginning of the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan reaffirmed Washington’s longstanding alliance with Panamanian strongman General Manuel Noriega. A historic U.S. ally and regional pillar of anticommmunist stability, Noriega fit well within the broader notion of the Reagan Doctrine. In addition to providing anticommmunist stability in an otherwise volatile region, Noriega proved a valuable partner in the many schemes and machinations of Reagan’s Central American policy. By the end of the decade, however, Noriega had become the foremost Central American concern for President George H.W. Bush and was subsequently ousted by the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. Why, then, in less than a decade, did U.S. policy towards Noriega shift so drastically? Examining the Reagan Doctrine through a historiographical lens provides a better understanding of the goals and implications of U.S.-Central American policy during Reagan’s presidency. More importantly, such an examination places the 1989 invasion in its proper post-Cold War context and demystifies Washington’s failed partnership with Noriega.

Keywords: Manuel Noriega, Operation Just Cause, Reagan Doctrine, Panama, U.S.-Latin American relations
On the evening of January 3, 1990, outside the papal residence in Panama, Manuel Antonio Noriega surrendered himself to U.S. authorities. Forced into exile by Operation Just Cause—the U.S. military intervention launched on December 20, 1989—Noriega was seen as a principal security threat to Panamanian democracy, the Panama Canal, and U.S. regional security. “Our first task is to restore normal bilateral relations between our two countries,” Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 25th, 1990. “The United States is no longer embroiled in an adversarial relationship with a corrupt and lawless regime.” But the relationship between Noriega and the United States had only recently become antagonistic; for most of the decade, Noriega was a valuable partner in the Central American policy of the Ronald Reagan administration.

Operation Just Cause represented the culmination of mounting opposition to Noriega in Washington. As early as 1984, with civilian elections set to transpire for the first time in sixteen years, Noriega was identified as a likely threat to Panama’s democratization process. Later, after two 1987 indictments by U.S. district courts on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering, Noriega steadily fell out of fortune in Washington, becoming the target of economic sanctions, covert action plots, hostile rhetoric, and U.S.-supported military coup d’état attempts. Ostensibly, Noriega’s narcotics connections posed the greatest threat to U.S. interests, aligning with Reagan’s war on drugs at home and George H.W. Bush’s shift toward combatting narcotrafficking abroad. Noriega’s “apprehension and return to the United States,” Bush remarked hours after his detainment, “should send a clear signal that the United States is serious in its determination that those charged with promoting the distribution of drugs cannot escape the scrutiny of justice.” Not to be overlooked, however, is Bush’s personal relationship with Noriega, which—in conjunction with numerous other factors—proved significant in provoking the December 1989 invasion of Panama.

In order to comprehend Noriega’s failed partnership with the United States fully, a deeper analysis of Reagan’s foreign policy toward Central America is necessary. As Central America’s wars and revolutions were gradually subsumed under the Reagan Doctrine, and as Reagan’s policies acquired increasingly transnational and privatized tones, Manuel Noriega remained an autonomous, omnipresent, but ultimately dispensable component of U.S.-Central American policy from Reagan’s Cold War crusade to Bush’s New World Order.

**Rolling Back the Evil Empire: The Reagan Doctrine in History and Historiography**

In the 1985 State of the Union address, President Ronald Reagan officially unveiled what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. Addressing ongoing civil wars throughout the Global South, the president declared that the United States “must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.” Reiterating the message to Congress the following year, Reagan further revealed that “growing resistance movements now challenge Communist regimes installed or maintained by the military power of the Soviet Union and its colonial agents—in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.” The United States “did not create this historical phenomenon,” the president stated, “but we must not fail to respond to it.” Not including Ethiopia, anticommmunist insurgents—“freedom fighters,” as referred to by the president—in each of these countries comprised the recipients of U.S. aid under the aegis of the Reagan Doctrine throughout the 1980s.

The Reagan Doctrine, significant as it was, represented less of a tangible foreign policy and more of a rhetorical justification for ongoing U.S. aid to insurgencies. Jonas Savimbi and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Washington’s allies in the Angolan civil war, were at first the only political faction that received U.S. aid after 1985. U.S. dollars and weapons began flowing to the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) in Cambodia and the Nicaragua Contras during Reagan’s first term. The covert operation to provide U.S. assistance to the Afghan mujahedeen, by far the most extensive application of the Reagan Doctrine, began during the final year of Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Equally significant, on the other hand, was Reagan’s Central American policy, which centered around hostility towards the Sandinistas in Nicaragua achieved by providing aid to the Contra insurgency.
Reagan’s Cold War revivalism. Guided by a Manichaean worldview and influenced by such neoconservative advisors as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan viewed détente, containment, and Carter’s foreign policy of appeasement with contempt, pledging instead to combat the Soviet empire vigorously by rolling back expansionism on the periphery. Traditional means, however, would be used to achieve this lofty desired outcome. In her 1979 influential essay “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Kirkpatrick harshly criticized the Carter administration for breaking ties with longstanding U.S. right-wing allies, notably the Shah of Iran and Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua. Authoritarian regimes, she argued, were necessary for regional stability and could, with U.S. guidance, successfully transition into a liberal democracy. Conversely, “A realistic policy which aims at protecting our own interest and assisting the capacities for self-determination of less developed nations will need to face the unpleasant fact that, if victorious, violent insurgency headed by Marxist revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to anything but totalitarian tyranny.”

By embodying such principles, Reagan not only made Central America the final arena in which authoritarian U.S. and “totalitarian” Soviet proxies confronted one another, but also imbued U.S. foreign policy with a spark of Wilsonian idealism that further expanded and developed during the last decade of the Cold War. Implicitly, the administration sought a structural overhaul of Central American society and politics resembling the U.S. model of development. A successful application of rollback entailed not just the removal of Soviet influences, but a region imbibed with socioeconomic freedom, political democracy, and geopolitical stability.

A longtime asset in Washington, though not yet a dictator, Manuel Noriega was placed back on the CIA’s payroll in 1981, receiving an annual subsidy equivalent to the presidential salary. Seemingly an innocuous side effect of Reagan and Kirkpatrick’s reinvigorated emphasis on cultivating autocratic allies, this action had nearly a decade-long reverberation, the effects of which were not fully experienced until the Cold War’s conclusion. After the death of General Omar Torrijos (a tenuous U.S. ally who ensured Panamanian stability from 1968 to 1981) in an ill-detailed plane crash, Noriega, then head of Panama’s G-2 Intelligence, began to consolidate political and military power as the Reagan Doctrine took hold in Central America.

If the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, as Reagan’s reversal of Carter’s conciliatory and human rights-centric policies became known, represented the ideological overtones of the Reagan Doctrine, a calculated approach to world politics with a realpolitik emphasis simmered under the surface. The Reagan administration provided aid to authoritarian governments and right-wing insurgencies in Central America based on anticommunist solidarity and fraternity. Yet, U.S. military forces were not deployed—aside from in an advisory role in El Salvador—in Central America during the 1980s. Though his support for the war in Vietnam never waned and the reassertion of American military capacities and testicular fortitude underpinned the rhetoric of the Reagan Doctrine, post-Vietnam syndrome and its accompanying ghost were never fully exorcised during Reagan’s duration in office. No such constraints would have bound a traditional realist foreign policy. American power and prestige may have declined by the 1980s, but to the nations of Central America, the United States still represented a great power. Secretary of State Alexander Haig exemplified this quintessential realist approach when he infamously offered to transform Cuba, widely perceived to be the driving force behind the Sandinista regime and surrounding leftist insurgencies, into an inconveniently-placed parking lot ninety miles off the coast of Florida.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, not Haig, instituted the realist framework of Reagan’s foreign policy approach in a speech to the National Press Club in 1984. Seeking not to diminish the national security threats facing the United States, but rather to determine the appropriate response, Weinberger stated:

Recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world’s defender. We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and should offer substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to our allies in their time of need, and help them maintain forces to deter attacks against them—usually we cannot substitute our troops and our will for theirs.
force. It was, in the words of historian Julian Zelizer, “a hawkish doctrine that fit comfortably within the tradition of conservative internationalism and post-Vietnam culture.” Weinberger did extensively outline the instances in which it would be appropriate to deploy U.S. troops; however, on the other hand, it “constituted a frank acknowledgment of the constraints on the ability of the United States to project its military power.” “This measured approach,” notes Zelizer, “would be crucial to Reagan’s success since he did not authorize a lengthy ground war during his second term… that would have tested the effectiveness and political popularity of conservative internationalism for guiding national security.”

Political scholar Alan Dobson argued in a 2002 publication that “With the hindsight of knowing the outcome of the Cold War the Reagan Doctrine sounds simply like a well-calculated realist tactic for the pursuit of US interests.” As the Soviet system decayed during the 1980s, U.S. foreign policy increasingly emphasized democratization as a method by which the Soviet empire could be rolled back on the periphery. Prodemocracy rhetoric remained nominally idealist during the Reagan years, and at the Cold War’s conclusion, Wilsonian idealism ostensibly reemerged as the dominant paradigm of international relations (IR) that would guide the United States into the hyperpower stage of development. Such an analysis, Dobson notes, obscures the notion that “with the ‘end of history’ it was a realistic objective to pursue democratic values internationally, whereas when the world was riven between democracy and a succession of powerful totalitarian opponents, it had not been.”

Democratization, then, transcended the divide between idealism and realism by the end of the Cold War, a transition that began with the Reagan Doctrine.

Dobson was not the first scholar to point out the realist undertones of Reagan’s foreign policy. Writing in 1987, IR scholar Roger Hansen also identified the transcendent capacities of prodemocracy and human rights, issues increasingly linked to the administration’s staunch anticommunist position during Reagan’s second term. Such linkage was tenuous, but “allowed the administration’s ‘realists’ to harness ideological support for ‘geopolitical’ purposes.” Hansen further labeled neoconservative rhetoric as “public relations packaging for a realpolitik effort to weaken the Soviet position in the Third World.” Stripped of its ideological overtones, “the Reagan Doctrine… represented a coherent policy in support of a strategic effort at containment.”

Neoconservatives never abandoned rhetorical support for anticommunist freedom fighters, making Washington’s prodemocracy focus decreasingly relevant as the prospects for democratization waned in each country subsumed by the Reagan Doctrine. More importantly, and democracy notwithstanding, “the geopolitical calculus suggested for determining when, where, and how the support of freedom fighters [could] maximize Soviet dilemmas would have been warmly endorsed by Metternich and Castlereagh,” model realist statesmen in nineteenth-century Europe.

Any strains of realism in Reagan’s foreign policy are admittedly constrained in a Central American context. The prospects of nuclear confrontation necessitated a more pragmatic approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, whereas Reagan could afford a more ideological attitude towards the Sandinistas, who of course possessed no such nuclear capacities. Writing in 1985 for Strategic Review, foreign policy analyst Ashley Tellis illustrated the incongruities between Reagan’s Central American and Soviet policies by placing Central American civil wars in a broader geopolitical context: the Mackinder-Spykman “World-Island” formulation. Tellis argued that at best, Central America was a peripheral region in which the Soviet Union—the landlocked “Heartland” power—intervened to foment revolution, inhibiting the United States—the maritime “Insular” power—from protecting its primary security objective, the peninsular European Rimland. Distracted by revolutions and insurgencies in Central America, Washington’s commitment to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies would be impeded and U.S. security interests on the Rimland, the focal point of World-Island hegemony, threatened.

The World-Island is an extreme example of realpolitik foreign policy and far better suited to the early years of the Cold War. More relevant to Reagan were the calamitous effects of Vietnam, a repetition of which was avoided at all costs by administration hardliners. Familiar faces from the Vietnam era reemerged in Washington’s policymaking circles as Reagan sought justification for his hardline approach to Central America. A commission chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger issued a report in January 1984 that both supported Reagan’s regional policies and offered a bleak outlook, grounded in domino theory rhetoric, of Central America sans U.S. interventionism: “A fully militarized and equipped Nicaragua” posed acute threats to “democratic, unarmed Costa Rica” and “vital U.S.
in the Panama Canal” and was accompanied by the “spectre of Marxist domination of the entire region.” Kissinger’s highly unrealistic predictions revealed that the domino theory, despite its abiding tenure in U.S. policy, was neither a pragmatic nor realist approach to Cold War geopolitics. Though its application ostensibly countered U.S. security threats at regional flashpoints, a lack of nuance and consideration of local factors made it far more Manichaean than practical. In this context, the domino theory rhetoric propounded by the Kissinger commission was no different. To be sure, U.S. interests were grounded in proliferating democracy throughout Central America, and the Panama Canal remained a lynchpin of U.S. security. That the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua and supported the Salvadoran insurgency, however, never truly threatened U.S. security to the degree hawkish ideologues claimed. If anything, such dubious U.S. allies as Manuel Noriega posed greater threats, especially to the Panama Canal, yet stability was prioritized over democratization in Panama. Reagan’s application of the domino theory was far more reflective of his administration’s ideological affinity with right-wing governments and insurgencies.

The ideological and in many ways Wilsonian components of the Reagan Doctrine are far more evident when viewing U.S.-Central American policy through a broader lens. Outside Nicaragua, the United States faced left-wing insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala and the emergence of a Marxist regime in Grenada. The administration responded primarily with military measures, but an economic component—the Caribbean Basin Initiative—also became a significant part of Washington’s efforts to sustain regional allies. “Believing economic downturns in Latin America aided the Communist cause,” writes historian Kyle Longley, “the White House requested duty-free status for various Caribbean goods as well as developmental loans to the basin.” Though Reagan met economic challenges with as much zeal as he did the ideological foe of Soviet communism, the lack of a committed and nuanced policy left a bitter legacy of failed development in Central American economies. Moreover, that Reagan championed U.S. interventionism as an alternative to the shortcomings of détente indicated the revival of Wilsonian sentiments that would guide U.S. policy in the final stage of the Cold War.16

Beyond Nicaragua, U.S. policy in Central America was largely uniform and grounded in an ideological commitment to authoritarian regimes in the name of anti-communism. As mentioned previously, El Salvador saw a prolonged and extensive application of U.S. COIN and was a principal recipient of Washington’s prodemocracy aid and rhetoric. Suffice it to say that Reagan’s Salvadoran policy fell drastically short of its stated military and political aspirations.17 Though smaller in scope, the administration’s policy approach to Guatemala resembled that of El Salvador. Right-wing regimes in Guatemala received less aid and fewer advisors, yet flagrant human rights abuses, political violence, and indigenous genocide occurred at levels surpassing even El Salvador.18 In neighboring Honduras, Reagan’s policies left a legacy of militarization and relegation to client-state status. The Honduran government tacitly tolerated the training of Washington’s Contra force on their territory, a clear violation of sovereignty, in exchange for U.S. aid in abundance. Finally, Costa Rica persisted as a bastion of Central American democracy and demilitarization, yet so too was its territorial sovereignty violated by Contra operations. U.S. disregard for Costa Rican sovereignty was nominally tolerated, as economic austerity programs and bolstered military security kept the country free from civil war, but relations between Washington and San José remained patronizing and dependent all the same.19 A more extensive analysis of Reagan’s foreign policy approach towards individual Central American nations falls outside the scope of this study. Each formed an integral component of broader U.S.-Central American policy and, as the last battlefields of the Cold War, are important in fostering a better understanding of the Reagan Doctrine in Central America.

Even further on the periphery, the minuscule island nation of Grenada unexpectedly became the only Central American-Caribbean arena in which conventional U.S. troops were deployed during Reagan’s presidency. Entirely anathema to Washington’s commitment to fighting proxy wars, the invasion of Grenada in 1983 represented a Cold War outcome achieved in a distinctly post-Cold War manner.

In response to the emergence of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), a radical Marxist regime, Operation Urgent Fury was ostensibly launched to restore democracy and protect American lives—few of which, in hindsight, were conceivably at risk. Few scholars ascribe to such notions, lacking nuance or substance and obfuscating the great-power motivations which simmered under the rhetorical surface of
the Reagan Doctrine. For political scientist and former policy analyst Russell Crandall, though, Grenada was too close geographically and too easy a military target to pass up the opportunity for regime change. Moreover, it was a fortuitous occasion to reassert U.S. military might after a quagmire in Vietnam and failed hostage rescue mission in Iran. Crandall is thus quick to label Urgent Fury overwhelmingly successful, since neither unfavorable outcome transpired. Historian Michael Grow is less praiseworthy; like Crandall, however, he emphasizes the influence of the failed Iranian hostage crisis, adding that the bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut provided the ideological impetus for the invasion. Referring to Urgent Fury as “rollback Lite,” Grow maintains that a symbolic victory was necessary for Reagan’s reelection aspirations to perpetuate military resolve in support of the administration’s tough foreign policy rhetoric and to send a message of American fortitude throughout Central America.

From the outset, Reagan’s Central American policy was guided and influenced by actors outside the foreign policy bureaucracy in Washington. The administration’s anticommunist rhetoric naturally acquired a transnational quality, as an extensive network of right-wing, authoritarian governments and insurgencies galvanized and flourished in the 1980s. Beyond providing aid to anti-communist factions in the Central American political realm, the Reagan administration also established close ties with the Argentine military government and was supported domestically by a burgeoning private sector eager to account for Washington’s perceived shortcomings in rolling back the Soviet empire.

Argentine military involvement in Central American civil wars predated Reagan’s inauguration, though the veterans of South America’s Dirty Wars were quickly enlisted as allies by the incoming administration. Argentine military advisors became vital components of a transnational anticommunist network and a right-wing counterpart to the international aspect of revolutionary communism. That the Argentine military aided former Nicaraguan National Guardsmen represented a culmination of cooperative contacts established during Operation Condor and fit well into Reagan’s broader aspirations to wage covert and proxy warfare against international communism in the Western Hemisphere, and though disagreements emerged regarding U.S. support for Britain in the Falklands War, global affairs scholar Ariel Armony notes that “coincidences on international policy nurtured a flexible bilateral relationship” between Washington and Buenos Aires. Moreover, Argentina’s expansion of the Dirty Wars to hemispheric proportions was concurrent with the belligerency of the Reagan Doctrine, which effectively revived U.S.-Soviet animosities. In Central America, then, “The anti-Communist crusade of authoritarian regimes such as Argentina and the aggressive U.S. posture vis-à-vis Soviet expansionism adopted by the Reagan administration…represented a convergence of foreign policy interests between counterrevolutionary forces in the South and the North.”

U.S.-Argentine cooperation thus represents an excellent example of authoritarian and anticommunist allies assuming an important position in the foreign policymaking process under Reagan.

The Reagan Doctrine also received notable, if overlooked, private sector support. Typically associated with the Pentagon’s extensive networks created to siphon aid to Nicaraguan freedom fighters, the Reagan Doctrine was in many ways a product of a renewed affinity towards covert operations and paramilitary subculture that emerged in the 1980s. And indeed, Soldier of Fortune magazine operators fought alongside U.S.-backed anticommunist forces in Nicaragua and El Salvador, among other places. What historian Kyle Burke refers to as the Third Option was far more impactful on U.S. foreign policy. Proselytized by the CIA’s Ted Shackley, a veteran of Vietnam’s Phoenix Program and an extensive paramilitary campaign in Laos, the Third Option deemphasized modernization theory and combatting communism through capitalist development in favor of U.S. aid for anticommunist insurgencies. “Americans did not need to waste money setting up expensive modernization projects, let alone find ways to make them work,” writes Burke. “Instead, they just needed to give the right weapons to the right people and then get out of the way.”

Though not typically characterized in such a manner, Manual Noriega was a quintessential example of a transnational actor in Reagan’s Central American policy. His precise role in the Reagan Doctrine will be examined in greater detail shortly; suffice it to say that his regional connections were far-reaching. Not only was Panama a bastion of anticommunist stability under Noriega’s watchful gaze, but La Niña himself was an instrumental part of Pentagon and CIA efforts to fund the Nicaraguan Contras covertly. In other words, Noriega was a key political figure in what became the Iran-Contra...
affair. He was also an extremely valuable intelligence asset for the CIA and U.S. Southern Command (South-Com). Noriega’s intelligence connections dated to his stint at the Peruvian Military Academy in the late 1950s, but as head of Panama’s G-2 intelligence in the 1970s and into the 1980s, he served as a vital source of intelligence on left-wing insurgencies throughout the region. He also proved highly cooperative with Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) efforts to curb narcotrafficking, a burgeoning threat to hemispheric security. On the other hand, Noriega was an extraordinarily duplicitous individual. Washington was well aware at the time that his intelligence connections stretched to Havana and into the Sandinista government in Managua. Extensive evidence has since surfaced tying Noriega to the Medellín cartel in Colombia and demonstrating that in addition to facilitating U.S. efforts to arm the Contras, he also provided weapons to left-wing guerrillas in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Panama remained unthreatened by communist influences, though wholly undemocratic—a phenomenon well understood by U.S. officials. For the Reagan White House, complicity in the many subplots of U.S.-Central American policy, Panamanian stability, and Canal security outweighed the nascent menace that was Manuel Noriega.

Scholars continue to grapple with the effects of Reagan’s foreign policy approach toward Central America. The devastation wrought on local populations is well-documented, and although socioeconomic malaise, political violence, and cultural repression cannot be entirely attributed to U.S. actions, a great deal of complicity on the part of U.S. policymakers does exist and should be acknowledged. What is clear in assessing the legacy of the Reagan Doctrine is that Manichaean idealism overshadowed any strains of pragmatic realism that existed, albeit in a limited capacity. “In justifying anticomunist interventionism in Central America,” writes Grow, “administration officials often resorted to apocalyptic imagery.” Reagan employed domino theory rhetoric, to be sure, but Secretary of State Haig went a step further, characterizing regional insurgencies as part of a broader operation, “a priority target list, a hit list if you will, for the ultimate takeover of Central America.”

A fervent and paranoid anticommunist, Reagan filled his foreign policy bureaucracy with hardline ideologues whose zeal for Cold War revivalism meshed better with early Cold War animosities toward the Soviet Union than with the new world order that arrived soon after he departed the White House. Moderate views in the administration were never fully obscured; broadly speaking, however, proponents of hardline policies guided the trajectory of U.S. foreign relations through the end of the Cold War. Such sentiments bequeathed subsequent administrations a complicated geopolitical situation in Central America, and Manuel Noriega—a product of Reagan’s Central American wars—rapidly became the first hemispheric security threat in a post-Cold War context. Perhaps the best demonstration of insufficient nuance is the fundamental incompatibility of prodemocracy and anticommunist rhetoric. In Central America, the United States supported socioeconomic oligarchies and military governments that engaged in social and political violence, cultural repression, human rights violations, and genocide—precisely the obstacles to democratization. And even as the Cold War neared its end and drugs replaced communism as the supposed principal threat to hemispheric security, U.S. anti-narcotics policies were just as incompatible with democracy promotion.

As mentioned previously, the Reagan administration revitalized a longstanding practice of U.S. support for right-wing dictators. That it also supported the Contras, a right-wing insurgency, represents yet another example of an unnuanced policy. Hypocrisy resonated within the Reagan Doctrine, and it was obvious that the administration was willing to overlook human rights violations and sociopolitical violence by its regional proxies in the name of anticommunism.

The Iran-Contra affair also emerged as a scathing and memorable legacy of Reagan’s presidency. Scholars have reached a nominal consensus on the duplicitous actions of Pentagon and CIA officials, yet one scholar, Edward Lynch, stands out with his justification of the scandal, arguing that the Boland amendments preventing U.S. aid to the Contras were rightfully circumvented by Reagan’s cronies. The lack of ironclad restrictions and present ambiguities indicated that Congress supported the Contras, so long as the operation remained covert. Such views represent an extreme minority interpretation of Iran-Contra. More accurately, Burke categorizes the affair as a missed opportunity to expose private conservative networks dedicated to fighting communism through extralegal and scrupulous means.

Individual components involved in Iran-Contra also represent significant legacies of the Reagan Doctrine. In this context, Manuel Noriega, a central figure in
Reagan’s Central American wars, transitioned from a regional ally during the Cold War to a glaring U.S. security threat after its conclusion. In order to analyze Noriega’s place in Reagan’s Central American policy fully, it is necessary to establish the contours of his relationship with the United States. As mentioned previously, Noriega became an intelligence asset for the CIA between 1956 and 1960 and for the U.S. Army as early as 1955. Within Panama’s military apparatus, however, Noriega’s ascent did not begin until Omar Torrijos seized power from elected president Arnulfo Arias in 1968. As Noriega began to consolidate power and gain important influence within the Torrijos regime as head of Panama’s G-2 intelligence bureau, he also became involved in numerous illicit operations. As early as 1971, the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs—the DEA’s predecessor—possessed solid evidence of Noriega’s complicity in regional narcotrafficking, though the Justice Department at the time all but refused to extradite a foreign intelligence official. Instead, an options paper was prepared, which included labeling Noriega a security threat to the Panama Canal Treaties, linking him to a coup attempt against Torrijos and assassination. Even as such drastic measures were considered, Noriega was increasingly viewed as an invaluable operator for CIA regional activities, leading to the beginning of his relationship with George H.W. Bush during his brief DCI tenure from 1976-77.33

Active as he was in regional narcotrafficking and money laundering schemes, Noriega also profited from numerous factors which enabled his consolidation of influence and power in Panama. Most significantly, the Panamanian National Guard, established and trained as a police force by U.S. advisors in the 1950s, benefited greatly from Panama’s seemingly natural role as a hotspot of criminal activities—a Central American Casablanca. In the words of Panama scholar Steve Ropp, “The increasing ability of the police/military institution beginning in the 1950s to extract resources from illicit service sector activities partially accounts for its growing power and relative autonomy during the 1960s and 1970s; it largely accounts for its survival as a central player in Panamanian politics into the late 1980s.” Internally, the military controlled key geographic sites from which regional transshipments of arms and other contraband items embarked with ease.34 As Noriega ascended the ranks of Panama’s military intelligence bureaucracy, he presided over an increasingly large zone of the illicit services sector, a fruitful endeavor to say the least.

So too did Noriega benefit from the U.S. military’s expanding presence in Panama. With the birth of U.S. SouthCom in 1963, Panama became a focal point of U.S. military education (including the School of the Americas, located in the Panama Canal Zone), intelligence gathering, and COIN operations throughout Central America. Political scientist Peter Sanchez notes that, beginning during the Second World War and extending beyond the end of the Cold War, U.S. military expansion “resulted [in] a complex of bases and defense sites that carried out US strategic policy in all of Latin America.” During Reagan’s presidency, SouthCom’s perceived significance grew and thus received a reinforcement of resources from hardline policymakers in the White House and Pentagon. After Torrijos’ death in 1981, Panama became an increasingly critical component of Reagan’s Central American military policy, as an operational base for COIN in El Salvador and a training ground for the Nicaraguan Contras. Additionally, Latin American military officers received training in COIN, intelligence, and jungle warfare techniques at the School of Americas. As Noriega’s prominence grew in step with the U.S. military presence in Panama, he became progressively more involved in the Reagan Doctrine’s machinations in Central America.

Noriega’s importance to U.S. intelligence agencies grew as he rose through the ranks of Panama’s military under Torrijos, supplying the CIA with valuable and accurate information about Cuba, the Sandinistas, and left-wing insurgencies. After Torrijos’ death in 1981, Noriega became an indispensable asset for Washington. Reagan’s Central American policy during his first term in office was characterized in large part by the pinnacle of U.S. collaboration with the nascent Panamanian military strongman. For example, Grow notes that “During this period, the intelligence information he provided about Castro’s Cuba was considered so valuable that [DCI] Casey traveled to Panama for personal briefings by the Panamanian dictator.” Noriega was equally invaluable as the roots of the Contra operation took hold in Reagan’s foreign policy bureaucracy. At the same time, however, Noriega’s duplicity and conniving tendencies were well-established. Extensive evidence has surfaced in recent years, but even at the time, Noriega’s connections to Cuba and the Sandinistas as well as his arms trafficking to Central American insurgencies were known and tacitly accepted.37 Nonetheless, his complicity in
the Contra operation—which included orchestrating guerrilla attacks against the Sandinistas and enlisting Panama’s corporate sector to aid with Oliver North and Richard Secord’s Project Democracy scheme—affirmed his vital position in U.S.-Central American policy.\(^38\)

That Noriega was an invaluable asset to Reagan’s Central American policy is indisputable. His value, however, did not mean that he was perceived wholeheartedly as an ally between 1981 and 1985. Noriega’s domestic and regional misconduct did not provide the impetus for Operation Just Cause in 1989, but it did set in motion a growing sector of opposition in Washington to the Panamanian strongman. The chronology began in March 1982, when Noriega, Rubén Darío Paredes, Armando Contreras, and Roberto Díaz Herrera—all National Guard officers—seized power from commander in chief Florencio Florez. A subsequent agreement dictated each officer’s tenure as commander in chief and effectively established the course of Panama’s military leadership—which remained authoritative over the civilian government—until 1989. By August 1983, the commander in chief position passed from Paredes to Noriega; so too were the former’s political ambitions wholly suppressed. “Many reasons were offered for the abandonment of Paredes,” writes Dinges, “but for Noriega one reason was sufficient: the need to sweep from the stage the only person strong enough to challenge Noriega’s personal rule.”\(^39\)

Civilian government elections were held the following year, which attracted sizeable amounts of attention from Washington and the U.S. embassy in Panama, but Panama’s strongman rule under Noriega was established by 1983.\(^40\)

Noriega persisted as an asset to Reagan’s Central American policies, but ensuring a democratic transition in Panama’s 1984 election was also an important consideration given broader U.S. efforts of democracy promotion. Problems for Washington began with the “abrupt resignation” of President Ricardo de Espriella in February. Shortly after, a memorandum to National Security Advisor (NSA) Robert McFarlane emphasized that “[Vice President Jorge] Illueca’s views are not favorable to us. He is a leftist and has never been restrained from showing it by imperatives of Panama’s political relationship with the U.S.”\(^41\) Fortunately, Illueca would not be a candidate in the 1984 elections, elections which posed newfound challenges to the U.S. interests in Panama.

U.S. concerns materialized almost immediately; a February 1984 memorandum to national security affairs consultant Richard Beal pointed out that although Noriega assured a smooth electoral process, power and money were prioritized over honesty and democracy. Pending the possibility of blatant PDF interference, “Congress may well question why Panama needs more money to strengthen the hand of another dictator,” indicating the importance of democratization within Washington’s foreign policymaking circles.\(^42\) Regarding the candidacy of Arnulfo Arias, a twice-ousted former president and career politician, a CIA report on the election noted that “neither Noriega nor the military institution would tolerate an Arias presidency and we see no constraints that would effectively preclude a coup against the [Panamanian] Defense Forces’ longtime antagonist should that be considered necessary.” Put differently, there was little reason to believe that Arias’ acrimony toward the military, which caused his overthrow by Torrijos in 1968, would produce a different result in 1984. In contrast, Washington highly favored the military-backed candidate Nicolas Barletta. CIA analysts predicted that “a Barletta victory would be characterized by continuing strong relations with the United States, support for US policy in Central America and the Caribbean, and generally conservative economic policies reminiscent of the de la Espriella government.” Above all, democratization was emphasized, at least in the period preceding the election. According to the CIA, A failed Panamanian electoral process would undercut US efforts to portray continued progress toward democratization in the region...an eventuality [that] would be exploited by Cuba and Nicaragua for anti-US propaganda purposes throughout the Caribbean, while in Panama the Cubans probably would use the period following a failed election to take advantage of unrest among leftist student groups and try to direct it against...US interests in Panama.\(^43\)

The U.S. embassy in Panama expressed high hopes for the 1984 elections, sentiments the Panamanian electorate shared. However, aspirations for a more legitimate government after sixteen years of military rule were not met. In a cable to Washington, Ambassador Everett Briggs described the best-case scenario as one in which “Barletta...squeaked out a narrow win...at worst, his election may be seen as seriously tainted, both at home and abroad.”\(^44\) Later in his message, addressing
the notion of the electoral fraud seen as inevitable by Barletta’s opposition, Briggs stated, “Fraud at a level necessary to assure a Barletta victory would be obvious to the world and would undo most of the positive effects of having an election to begin with.”

Barletta won a closely-contested electoral victory marred by blatant fraud, violence, and vote-tampering perpetrated by Noriega and his PDF goons. By July 1984, the U.S. embassy in Panama had determined that Barletta’s dependence and limitations, owing to his tenuous relationship with Noriega and the omnipresent PDF, made his government “less than the ideal vehicle for realizing some of our policy objectives in Panama.” Nevertheless, U.S. interests would best be served by “[working] with Barletta and the civilian government even on matters of direct interest to the PDF.”

Put simply, the mere occurrence of an election, patently obvious fraud notwithstanding, sufficiently fulfilled Washington’s inclination toward Panamanian democracy.

Though Barletta represented the United States’ preferred candidate, his presidency required a great deal of outside assistance to survive Panama’s corrupt political realm. A July 1984 memorandum from NSA McFarlane regarding Barletta’s upcoming visit to Washington noted that U.S. “objectives in receiving him [were] to demonstrate the importance we place upon Panama as an ally, to reinforce Barletta’s basically favorable disposition toward the United States, and to help strengthen his standing with respect to the military.”

McFarlane in turn noted that the new president “[would] require political skill and assistance from Panama’s friends to achieve his political goals: to reunite a polarized body politic, to achieve sufficient freedom of action and independence from the Panamanian military and to secure the financial resources necessary to fuel a recovery of the country’s depressed economy.”

An October memorandum from Oliver North to McFarlane further emphasized the issue of military preponderance, stating that “The Panamanian Defense Forces will undoubtedly remain loyal to General Noriega in any confrontation between he and Barletta.” Nonetheless, it was perceived that Barletta’s economic programs, complicity with U.S. antinarcotics policies, and role in the Contadora peace negotiation process aligned with U.S. interests. North also highlighted the commitment to rollback, writing that “during the second Reagan administration…we will not tolerate a Cuban-supported communist state on the mainland of this hemisphere.” Such sentiments resulted in renewed U.S. efforts to cultivate stronger ties with Noriega.

A veneer of unreality characterized U.S.-Panamanian relations throughout the pivotal year of 1984. After Barletta’s electoral victory, Panama was seen as a model of democratic transition which Washington sought for the surrounding Central American region otherwise engulfed in insurrectionary chaos. Despite overwhelming evidence that Noriega doctored the election and continued PDF supremacy over the civilian government, any notion of electoral fraud simply had no place in U.S. policy toward Panama and Central America more broadly. Emboldened by his complicity in Barletta’s triumph, Noriega thus cultivated approval by U.S. officials by creating a resurgent image of himself as an ally in U.S. efforts to disrupt regional drug trafficking and money laundering.

As Ambassador Briggs noted in a May 1984 cable, it was becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile “the paradox created by our strong and genuine support for honest elections in Panama, on the one hand and our continuing interests, which we hope will be well-served by a somewhat tainted Barletta government, on the other.”

Panama remained a hotspot for Central America’s illicit services sector and Noriega at the center of Washington’s Contra operation; both phenomena benefitted the Panamanian strongman as he continued to consolidate power and authority over Panama’s civilian government.

**Overripe Pineapples: Deteriorating U.S.-Panamanian Relations and the Making of a Just Cause**

Noriega remained a strong U.S. ally as the Reagan administration transitioned into its second term. Crises began to mount as early as 1985, however, signaling that Washington’s perceptions of Noriega were beginning to sour. The first crisis occurred when the body of Hugo Spadafora, a former ally of Torrijos and critic of Noriega, was found beheaded just across the Costa Rican border. Long an adversary, Spadafora supposedly possessed incriminating evidence regarding Noriega’s illicit dealings, notably his connection with the Medellin cartel in Colombia. Before his premature death, Spadafora did present U.S. officials with some pieces of evidence linking Noriega and the Contras to Medellin, but such findings did little to shift opinions about either party. Nor did U.S. perceptions of Noriega change much after Spadafora’s murder, which could not be traced
to the PDF in a legal sense but was widely believed in Panama to be the work of Noriega’s operators. Moreover, such gruesome political violence was entirely anathema to Panama, especially in comparison to neighboring countries where Reagan’s death squads murdered and disappeared political enemies with impunity and committed rampant and flagrant violations of human rights. In any event, notes Eytan Gilboa, a leading Israeli scholar of international diplomacy, “Bureaucratic infighting, mainly among the State Department, CIA, and DEA...allowed Noriega to conclude that his status in Washington was well protected. He believed that he had only a few opponents in the State Department who did not realize the valuable contributions he had made to U.S. interests and that his friends in the CIA and DOD would defend and protect him against these opponents.” That a unified condemnation of Noriega failed to emerge after Hugo Spadafora’s murder represented a grossly missed opportunity, though it did signal a crack in the foundation of Washington’s relationship with its Panamanian ally.

An unlikely alliance on Capitol Hill did emerge in opposition to Noriega after Spadafora’s death in 1985. As part of his work chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Senator John Kerry began to investigate Noriega’s narcotrafficking links with the Contras. Kerry’s anti-Noriega stance was joined by Republican Senator Jesse Helms, the recipient of an extensive lobbying campaign by Spadafora’s brother Winston, and Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliot Abrams, a fierce opponent of the Panama Canal Treaty. Dating to 1984, narcotics were becoming increasingly relevant to U.S. policy, especially toward Panama. Shortly after the 1984 election, a cable from Ambassador Briggs emphasized that “Barletta should understand that we will increasingly judge our relationship with other countries on the basis of their performance in the narcotics area.”

Nineteen eighty-seven was another pivotal year in the relationship between the United States and Noriega, at this point in a stage of deterioration. First, Colonel Roberto Díaz Herrera came forth with a lengthy confession regarding the illicit activities of his former coup ally. “Díaz Herrera,” according to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, “stated that he collaborated with General Noriega in engineering the outcome of presidential elections; that he had evidence demonstrating that Noriega directed the 1985 slaying of a leading Noriega critic, Dr. Hugo Spadafora; that Noriega planned the 1981 death of Panama’s leader, Gen. Omar Torrijos; that members of the PDF [were] involved in international drug trafficking, and in the illegal sale of visas to Cubans.” Anti-American demonstrations, orchestrated by Panamanian authorities immediately followed Diaz Herrera’s accusations, as did a suspension of U.S. economic and military aid to the Panamanian government. The United States then attempted to enter into multi-party negotiation with the ultimate goal of prompting Noriega’s resignation, but the complex and extensive nature of the process ensured that the policy met with little success. Next, and entirely separate from Senator Kerry’s ongoing inquiry, the Justice Department set in motion an investigation of their own that culminated with two indictments of Noriega, in Tampa and Miami, on narcotics trafficking charges. By February of 1988, a friendly dictator had been indicted and an ousted president—Eric Arturo Delvalle—recognized in Washington, truly an unprecedented turn of events in U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan White House emanated characteristically firm rhetoric castigating Noriega, but took few tangible actions during decisive moments throughout 1987.

Perceptions of Noriega shifted negatively by 1988 as part of a broader regional antinarcotics policy that was beginning to take shape in the last year of the Reagan administration. In a speech by Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters Ann Wrobleski, Panama was identified as one of two countries in which the United States possessed “sufficient evidence to indict ranking leaders for involvement in narcotics trafficking.” From the outset, then, Panama was an aberration in U.S.-Latin American policy as it transitioned from a Cold War focus on anticommunism to a post-Cold War context. Armed cartels and narcotraffickers elsewhere in Latin America were a prominent security threat, to be sure, but in Panama, the central government—more specifically, Manuel Noriega—was the principal threat to regional security and U.S. interests.

In addition to antinarcotics measures, with the end of the Cold War in sight, the prodemocracy rhetoric of the Reagan administration began to take on a more urgent tone. Secretary of State George Schultz promoted this notion to the Senate in March 1988, citing examples of Central American military
dictatorships-turned-democracies. Noriega’s subsis-
tence, he argued, belied U.S. regional policy. “What we
face in Panama,” he thundered, “is a threat to democracy;
a threat to our ability to stop the international drug traffick-
ers; a threat to the safety and stability of this hemisphere.”
“The earlier Noriega leaves,” he added, “the better
Panama’s interests will be served.”

In a statement to the House of Representatives in
April 1988, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-Amer-
ican Affairs Elliot Abrams reemphasized flourishing
trends of democratization in Latin America. Marxist
insurgencies continued as a threat to nascent Latin
American democracies, but narcotics, particularly in
Panama were seen as equally menacing. Abrams reit-
erated Schultz’s previous statement virtually word-for-
word, adding that the narcotics issue was particularly
relevant in Panama because “drug power reached into
the very core of government.” Secretary of Defense
Frank Carlucci echoed his fellow Cabinet member’s
sentiments in an address a month later. Narcotics,
he claimed, were rapidly superseding terrorism and
communist subversion as the preeminent threat to hemi-
spheric security, which he argued was best achieved by
“creating the conditions for democracy in each country…
by removing the elemental social and economic prob-
lems which these internal and external elements seek to
exploit.” It can be reasonably concluded that by this
point, Washington had reached a consensus that Norie-
ga’s removal was necessary, if not vital, for purposes of
regional security and democratization.

Nineteen eighty-eight also marked the first year in
which the Reagan White House levied economic sanc-
tions against Panama. A memorandum to the President
in April laid the groundwork, stating that “the actions
of the Noriega/Solis regime constitute such an extraor-
dinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the
United States that a declaration of a national emergen-
cy is appropriate.” In his executive order, Reagan
proclaimed that hostile economic measures meant
to isolate Noriega from any loans, hard currency, or
general funds “[were] intended to extend the effective-
ness of actions initiated in cooperation with the Govern-
ment of Panama and its President, Eric Arturo Delval-
le.” Reagan also addressed the Panama Canal, labeling
the 1978 Treaty “the law of the land.” “We will uphold
our treaty obligations,” the President added, “and where
differences arise, we will work together with you to
resolve them in a deliberate and dignified way.” In
other words, the Reagan administration had no quarrel
with the people of Panama or the PDF, but solely
Noriega, demonstrating a degree of solidarity with
Delvalle, affirming opposition to Noriega, and priori-
tizing Canal security. The White House further clarified
Reagan’s remarks, noting that “By defying the order of
President Delvalle to relinquish his post and by attempt-
ing to overthrow the legitimate constitutional authori-
ty, Noriega is undermining the stability of Panama.”
Though U.S. sanctions targeted Panama’s commercial
and private banking sectors, the White House expressed
its desire “to avoid lasting damage to the Panama-
nian banking sector and the international banking
community beyond that already caused by Noriega.”

After Noriega’s impeachment of Delvalle by, at
minimum, dubious legal means, Assistant Secretary
Abrams addressed the issue, belaboring Washington’s
refusal to acknowledge Delvalle’s impeachment and
affirming the Reagan administration’s commitment to
democracy and civilian government. Evoking a certain
sense of solidarity, Abrams highlighted the PDF’s
accomplishments, but clarified that the institution was
sorely in need of modernization and professionalization
and had no place in civilian politics if Panama’s demo-
cratic transition were to transpire uninhibited. Institu-
tional change by the PDF was also necessary to maintain
Canal security and ensure Panama’s economic prosper-
ity. For President Reagan, Noriega persisted as the
most substantial inhibition to Panama’s political develop-
ment. Noriega’s retirement, per President Delvalle’s
suggestion, “would contribute very substantially to
reducing political tensions and set the stage for a prompt
transition to democracy in Panama.” President Reagan
accompanied his remarks with rather severe economic
sanctions, yet neither measure had the desired effect of
ousting Noriega and restoring the Delvalle regime as
Panama’s legitimate civilian government.

After George H.W. Bush’s electoral victory in 1988,
the removal of Noriega assumed greater importance,
likely because the incoming president was well aware
that Noriega possessed incriminating evidence against
himself and other members of Reagan’s foreign policy
bureaucracy. Yet even in his last months as Vice-Pre-
sident, certain discrepancies between Bush’s Noriega
policy and that of Reagan materialized. Eager to abide
by Panama’s constitution so that Delvalle’s impeach-
ment could be opposed on a strong legal foundation,
Reagan was willing to “quash an indictment that could
not be enforced” or followed by extradition to the United States—an action prohibited by the Panamanian constitution.\textsuperscript{49} Newly-elected President Bush was bound by no such legal restraints in conducting measures intended to disempower and extradite Noriega.\textsuperscript{70}

The Reagan to Bush transition was nonetheless characterized by familiar shortcomings. Bush promulgated policies that departed from his predecessor, yet Noriega’s resistance only grew fiercer. “The change from Reagan to Bush did not correct the basic flaws in U.S. policy,” writes Gilboa. “Although Bush was more determined than Reagan to remove Noriega and was more willing to use force to achieve this goal, the results of his policy remained the same. Noriega continued to doubt the credibility of the American military threats and felt free to pursue his domestic abuses and to challenge the United States.”\textsuperscript{71} Anti-Noriega policies initiated by Reagan—covert operations, a bolstered U.S. SouthCom military presence, economic sanctions, and support for failed coup attempts—were all subsumed into Bush’s Seven-Point Plan, interpreted as mere posturing by Noriega. In May 1989, despite Washington’s overtures, Noriega—more blatantly than in 1984—tampered with electoral results yet again and was further emboldened to initiate a political violence campaign perpetrating by loyal PDF members.\textsuperscript{72} By this point, the United States’ relationship with Delvalle, once viewed as the fiat of Panamanian democracy, had deteriorated, and Noriega had survived a combined offensive of U.S. officials acting with unprecedented unity. Brushing aside attempted negotiations and economic sanctions, Noriega was able to portray himself as a Panamanian nationalist and popular symbol of anti-imperialism, to the detriment of U.S. policy goals and credibility. All the while, throughout the covert operations phase, a series of failed coups against Noriega—which continued, with tacit U.S. support until October 1989—convincing the Bush administration that military measures against Noriega and the PDF had become necessary.\textsuperscript{73}

Scholarly arguments exist postulating that even during the stage of crisis from 1985 to 1989, the United States did not horribly bungle its Panamanian policy. Missteps certainly occurred, but within a broader continuum, a continuum in which steady and escalating pressure was applied against Noriega until the invasion and dissolution of the PDF was deemed necessary. The Noriega crisis represented a moment of errant confusion; all the while, the United States pursued its economic and security interests and preserved American hegemony in Central America. The conflict was prolonged in large part because of Noriega’s tenacious stubbornness and autonomy and because the U.S. invasion came as a last resort to destroy a military force of its own making and dislodge a petty tyrant no longer useful to U.S. policy.\textsuperscript{74} The notion that the U.S. invasion represented a tacit admission by the Bush administration that Noriega’s regime could have persisted for much longer is also a reasonable explanation. Propped up by the PDF, Noriega successfully rebuffed numerous efforts from civilian opposition in the 1984 and 1989 elections to foster democratization and reduce military influences in national politics. So too did Noriega dismiss U.S. efforts to foster similar developments.\textsuperscript{75}

In any event, Operation Just Cause was initiated in December 1989 and brought about Noriega’s relatively swift downfall, an ignominious end to an unsavory alliance with no place in a post-Cold War setting.

To many contemporary observers, Operation Just Cause heralded a new U.S. foreign policy approach toward Latin America. Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the end of the Cold War in Europe, the United States reasserted itself with profound vigor on the hemispheric stage. And though the Sandinistas would not be removed from power electorally until 1990 and civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala continued well into the early 1990s, the Soviet threat was all but vanquished from the United States’ backyard. Narcotrafficking replaced communism as the preeminent threat to hemispheric security; in the broader world, rogue dictators, many of whom were Cold War allies, constituted the gravest danger to U.S. primacy and unipolarity. Manuel Noriega, a drug-dealing tyrant and dictator fallen out of esteem in Washington, thus met both requirements for regime change in the post-Cold War setting.\textsuperscript{76}

A closer look reveals that Just Cause demonstrated more continuity than change with the forces that guided U.S.-Central American policy during and before the Cold War. Reagan’s invasion of Grenada and the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic remain the prevailing antecedents to the events of 1989 and stand out in comparison to the countless covert operations and proxy wars conducted by Washington in Latin America’s Cold War. Just Cause, then, more closely resembles U.S. gunboat interventions during the imperial era, from the War of 1898 to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s declaration that Washington was a Good Neighbor once more.
U.S. hegemony over Latin America never faded during the Cold War—far from it. Political scientist Peter Smith argues instead that an oscillating hegemony experienced a period of resurgence in the 1980s that left the United States poised to resume its traditionally dominant role once the Cold War ended. As extra-hemispheric powers (the Soviets) withdrew and intra-hemispheric challengers (Cuba) declined, the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary were at once realized to their fullest potential, and as the appeal of Marxism subsided, so too did the opportunity for right-wing assertions of political power; anticommunism had a place in regional geostrategy no more. Less relevant, then, is determining whether Washington’s disposition for Central American interventions increased after the Cold War; more significant was launched. From the perception that the United States was forced to change.

The United States’ first invocation of a new rationale for its hegemony over Latin America never faded during the Cold War—far from it. Political scientist Peter Smith argues instead that an oscillating hegemony experienced a period of resurgence in the 1980s that left the United States poised to resume its traditionally dominant role once the Cold War ended. As extra-hemispheric powers (the Soviets) withdrew and intra-hemispheric challengers (Cuba) declined, the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary were at once realized to their fullest potential, and as the appeal of Marxism subsided, so too did the opportunity for right-wing assertions of political power; anticommunism had a place in regional geostrategy no more. Less relevant, then, is determining whether Washington’s disposition for Central American interventions increased after the Cold War; more significant was launched. From the perception that the United States was forced to change.

The Western Hemisphere was far from the only global arena in which the United States’ role changed in 1989. With the Soviet Union’s collapse, an end to the bipolar nuclear rivalry which outlined the contours of the Cold War broadened the definition of U.S. security concerns. Put differently, a novel approach to international relations, recontaminated with Wilsonian idealism, enabled a more inclusive conception of national security. Pushed to the periphery by nuclear bipolarity, such issues as democratization, human rights, the expansion of free markets, and narcotrafficking could in 1989 be addressed head-on by the United States, quickly on its way to becoming a hyperpower.

Such was the context in which Operation Just Cause was launched. From the perception that the United States presided over a massive cyclical shift in history—the fall of communism—emerged the “wimp factor” rationale for Bush’s Panamanian invasion. Noriega highlighted the United States’ perceived impotence; if a petty dictator could not be ousted from Central America, global democratization had few prospects for success. “It is doubtful,” political scientist Lars Schoultz colorfully quips, “that history will ever reveal the smoking gun of Mr. Bush telling the Pentagon, ‘Let’s invade Panama so that the press will stop calling me a wimp.’” And indeed, Bush’s policy rhetoric was grounded in fostering democracy in Panama. “The Noriega regime continues to threaten and intimidate Panamanians who believe in democracy,” Bush told the Council of the Americas in May 1989, as elections in Panama transpired. “All nations that value democracy—that understand free and fair elections are the very heart of the democratic system—should speak out against election fraud in Panama,” the President demanded. Bush’s credibility, on the other hand, hinged on Noriega’s removal before the many questions and problems of the post-Cold War world could be addressed. Panama became a symbolic battlefield, at which the United States, no longer forced to demonstrate geopolitical resolve against communism, could instead uphold credibility on the world stage and maintain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

The invasion of Panama can also be seen as the root of the United States’ humanitarian intervention impulse. Free of the Cold War’s shackles, successive administrations in Washington from Bush to the present have sought out areas of the world experiencing inhumane conditions and dispensed U.S. troops and dollars as remedies. Operation Just Cause was not, however, a humanitarian intervention in any sense of the term. As mentioned previously, human rights violations under Noriega were mild compared to those perpetrated by the Salvadoran and Guatemalan right-wing governments and the Nicaraguan contras. Hugo Spadafora’s murder, gruesome as it was, was a relatively isolated incident and entirely aberrational to Panamanian society. In any event, civilian casualties outnumbered military fatalities, and PDF resistance was drastically overstated by U.S. military after-action reports. In other words, inhumane conditions were largely absent from Panama and the invasion itself was more of a human rights violation than humanitarian intervention.

If not a humanitarian intervention, Just Cause can certainly be characterized as the culmination of a souring relationship between Washington and Noriega. Making connections with Noriega in the 1950s, the United States breathed life initially into a marriage of convenience, ill-conducted by both sides, then engineered half-hearted divorce procedures with Reagan’s policies that enabled Noriega to remain in power for far too long. Journalist John Dinges further argues that the invasion was a personal act against Noriega and consistent with an incoherent, improvisational, and reactionary U.S. policy that featured a disproportionate application of force against a negligible threat to U.S. security. The White House, he argues, never took a leading role until the invasion was authorized. Moreover, an insistence on unilateralism and extradition to the United States...
transformed Noriega into a symbol of Latin American nationalism, enabling his rule to continue far beyond its desired expiration. Other scholars have characterized Noriega as a casualty of Reagan’s Central American wars and the invasion as an attempt by Bush to clean up a mess of his own creation—Bush, it must be remembered, made contact with Noriega as DCI in 1976, after which Noriega became an invaluable asset to Reagan’s Central American policy. The personal factor, while not entirely satisfactory in rationalizing Just Cause, must be considered as at least a subsidiary cause for the invasion. Noriega had many enemies in Washington by 1989—John Kerry, Elliot Abrams, Jesse Helms, to name a few—and as numerous U.S.-encouraged coup attempts demonstrated, no shortage of adversaries in Panama.

Barring a conclusive impetus for Operation Just Cause, the invasion can doubtlessly be classified as reminiscent of U.S. gunboat interventions in Central America during the imperial era. Multilateralism was at least broached—though never meaningfully considered—with an appeal to the Organization of American States (OAS) by Washington. Addressing the OAS in November 1989, Secretary of State James A. Baker declared that “When the will of the people is trampled, as it was so visible and viciously in Panama, the OAS must denounce such abuses with courage and candor.” To abide by the organization’s charter, “multilateralism must not become a synonym for the lowest common denominator, and the principle of nonintervention cannot become an excuse for looking the other way.”

OAS denunciatory rhetoric against Noriega did little, as one might expect, and multilateralism was not the course adopted by Washington. President Bush, notes former NSC Director of Latin American affairs Robert Pastor, was condemned globally for a unilateral invasion and castigated for his lackluster response to the end of the Cold War and accompanying developments. Nevertheless, argues Pastor, Bush’s pragmatism set a promising tone for U.S. policies aimed to promote democratization and deeper economic relationships within the hemisphere. Conservative academics often adopt a similar tone in assessing Operation Just Cause, arguing that, like Grenada previously, the invasion was an overwhelming success: democracy was restored, American lives protected, and U.S. forces avoided a quagmire application of COIN. From a military perspective, Just Cause was a clear though not unblemished victory. Panama’s unique history—the country has long been militarily, socioeconomically, and culturally linked with the United States and possessed neither a capable military nor aggressively nationalist sentiments—set a dangerous precedent for future application of U.S. military force abroad.

Such successes cannot be entirely denied, and although ousting a dictator embroiled in regional narcotrafficking schemes was a positive step in the United States’ declared war on drugs, the reassertion of U.S. might against a minuscule nation cannot be overlooked. The invasion of Panama reflected interventions of both the imperial and post-Cold War eras in the sense that U.S. power against sovereign governments was, in each instance, entirely unrestrained, argues political scientist Peter Smith. After the Cold War, lacking ideological confrontation, Washington sought increasingly to satanize geopolitical rivals on an individual basis, a trend which began with Manuel Noriega. Similarly, if extra-hemispheric rivalries guided the U.S. doctrine of containment through its many iterations during the Cold War, then Operation Just Cause represented a swift inwards shift in U.S. policy toward addressing security concerns within the hemisphere.

Rollback, the Reagan administration’s rendering of containment, was predicated on drawing a line in the sand in Central America where Soviet incursion would be tolerated no longer. “George Bush, on the other hand,” writes historian William LeoGrande, “seemed to regard Central America’s problems as the troublesome bequest of his predecessor rather than as issues of intrinsic significance. His main priority was to get Central America off the foreign policy agenda so he could concentrate on important matters such as U.S.-Soviet relations, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the [impending] Persian Gulf War.” Compared to the bellicosity of Reagan and his hardline advisors, the Bush administration was far more conciliatory and receptive to Congress and the American public. Policy goals changed little, and Bush demonstrated his willingness to apply U.S. military force with Just Cause. Yet, a more pragmatic administration with more pressing issues to confront on the world stage relegated Central America to its traditionally insignificant role in U.S. foreign policy.

More broadly, with a pivot away from the Reagan Doctrine, the Third World no longer possessed a significant seat at the table in Washington’s foreign policy outlook. The Reagan Doctrine did not perish—far from it, in fact; the roots of conservative internationalism, the
guiding force behind the United States’ global war on terror, can be traced to the architects of Reagan’s foreign policy in the early 1980s (and in many cases, emanated from the same individuals). Absent a discernible threat—Soviet communism—to the American way of life, the moral and ideological aspects of the Reagan Doctrine were simply inapplicable in a post-Cold War context. So too was Central America, once an arena in which to confront the Soviets, quickly consigned to irrelevancy after 1989. With Noriega’s removal and extradition, the principal threat to democratization in the hemisphere was resolved, and by the mid-1990s, when Reagan’s wars at long last ended, Central America could be found on few geostrategic maps in Washington. The region was brought to the forefront of the Cold War in the 1980s with Reagan’s highly publicized wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador and became the first test of U.S. unilateralism as the Cold War drew to a close. With the alleged “end of history,” and a much more definitive conclusion to Manuel Noriega, Operation Just Cause heralded an end to the Cold War in Latin America and a new approach to U.S. foreign policy.

Notes


7. For a thorough analysis of Kirkpatrick’s impact on Reagan’s foreign policy, see David F. Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989 (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 199-201.

8. Theories and conjecture abound regarding the circumstances of Torrijos’ death. Many leading military figures in Panama and North American academics ascribe culpability to Noriega; given his upward trajectory after 1981 and the tendency for his political allies to quickly become adversaries, this is a reasonable and likely assertion.

9. AFP CD, 1984, 68. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President George H.W. Bush, General Colin Powell further expanded the Weinberger Doctrine, which guided U.S. military applications in the immediate post-Cold War years.


19. For an excellent overview of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica, subjects often glossed over by scholars of Reagan-era foreign relations, see Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 47-77.

21. Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 149-55. For more critical perspectives, see Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 110-14; Longley, In the Eagle’s Shadow, 296-98; Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 179.


24. Private sector aid and funds redirected from Pentagon arms sales to Iran was made necessary by the Boland Amendments, passed by Congress in 1982 and 1984, that restricted U.S. intelligence agencies from attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government.


26. Acne scars graced the dictator’s face from an early age, creating a striking resemblance to a pineapple. Much to Noriega’s disdain, La Niña was a nickname and insult commonly uttered by his many enemies.

27. Quoted in Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions, 126.


30. Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictators, 242. For the Reagan administration’s embrace of the authoritarian right and alienation of the “totalitarian” left, see Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 195-96; Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 217-20.


32. Burke, Revolutionaries for the Right, 211-12.


38. For a thorough overview of Noriega’s connections with the Pentagon’s Contra operation, see Frederick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America’s Bungled Affair with Noriega (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1990), 157-82. See also, Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 44-46, 57-59 for a closer look at Noriega’s role in Washington’s Contra operations.

39. Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 139-42, 150-55.

40. Noriega’s rapid ascendance effectively repudiated Torrijos’ stated ambition for the military to return to the barracks in favor of an elected civilian government. Any steps towards democratization in Panama undertaken by Torrijos were unraveled expeditiously between his death in 1981 and Noriega’s consolidation of authority in 1983.


42. Memorandum for Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Richard S. Beal, February 17, 1984, Panama Elections Folder, Box Cable 4, Reagan Library Archives.


44. Cable from American Embassy, Panama to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., May 1984, Panama Elections Folder, Box Cable 4, Reagan Library Archives.

45. Cable from American Embassy, Panama to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., May 1984, Panama Elections Folder, Box Cable 4, Reagan Library Archives.

46. Cable from American Embassy, Panama to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., July 1984, Panama Elections Folder, Box Cable 4, Reagan Library Archives.


49. National Security Council memorandum from Oliver L. North to NSA Robert C. McFarlane, October 25, 1984, Panama 5:22:84-10:25:84 Folder, Box 33, Reagan Library Archives. Contadora was a multinational peace plan sponsored by the governments of Panama, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Ostensibly, the United States supported its Latin American allies attempts to end Central America’s devastating civil wars; in reality, hardline policymakers in Washington staunchly opposed and successfully undermined Contadora negotiations.

50. Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 195-205.

51. Cable from American Embassy, Panama to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., May 1984, Panama Elections Folder, Box Cable 4, Reagan Library Archives.

52. Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 215-20. More can be said about Spadafora that falls outside the scope of this study. See relevant sections in Dinges, Our Man in Panama; Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator and Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story.


54. American Embassy in Panama to Secretary of State, July 1984.

55. AFP CD, 1987, 797.

56. For this study, the negotiation process is not particularly relevant beyond an acknowledgement of its shortcomings. For a
more extensive treatment, see Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator* and Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*; for a brief, yet harsh rendering, consult Gilboa’s article.

62. Memorandum for the President from Director of Office of Management and Budget James C. Miller III, April 8, 1988, Dan Crippen Collection, Panama Folder, Box 8, Reagan Library Archives.
63. Executive Order by President Ronald Reagan, April 8, 1988, Dan Crippen Collection, Panama Folder, Box 8, Reagan Library Archives.
65. Questions and Answers Concerning IEEPA, April 1988, Dan Crippen Collection, Panama Folder, Box 8, Reagan Library Archives.
70. On the relationship between the United States’ soured relationship with Noriega and geopolitical considerations, see Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 177-82; Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, 271-73.
88. U.S. overconfidence in the wake of Just Cause, as well as Operation Desert Storm, had the adverse effect of fostering conditions in Washington that proved advantageous for the ill-fated Iraqi 2.0 intervention. In this sense, a great deal of continuity is present between the elder and younger Bush administrations—and not just because war criminals found employment easily in both. See D’Haeseleer, “Paving the Way for Baghdad.”
89. Longley, *In the Eagle’s Shadow*, 314-17.
91. LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 578-79.
92. Greg Grandin argues this point convincingly in *Empire’s Workshop*.